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INTRODUCTION
Corporate law has been forced to confront its political side.
Throughout the twentieth century, scholars focused on fiduciary
duties, agency costs, and social efficiency in their analysis of the
corporation.  While the relationships amongst executives, directors,
and shareholders were subject to close scrutiny, the most direct
relationship – namely, the shareholders’ election of directors – was
taken for granted, a required but largely uncontroversial (and
inconsequential) annual exercise in democracy.  The ramifications
of this were well understood: the separation between ownership
and control is foundational to the field.1  But this lack of
accountability on the part of elected officials to their constituents
was to be addressed through shareholder suits, securities
regulation, or tender offers.  The possibility for electoral oversight
was largely assumed to be impossible.
However, a convergence of economic, demographic, and
legal forces has created the new world of “shareholder
democracy.”  The growth of institutional shareholders has been
accompanied by their interest in exercising collective power to
oversee management.  As part of their oversight, these
shareholders are taking their voting rights seriously.  Difficulties in
exercising this power still remain, and shareholder democracy
advocates have an array of proposals designed to make their voting
rights more effective.2  But as one set of commentators has noted,
“Never has voting been more important in corporate law.”3
1 The seminal work is ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).  Their work on the separation of
ownership and control has arguably led to much of the later work in the field.
Cf. Edward B. Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1619, 1624
(2001) (“It was as if everyone already knew (from Berle and Means) that the
master problem of corporate law was agency costs, and along came an economic
model and a vocabulary to elaborate that view.”).
2 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005)
3 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting,
Working Paper, August 2007, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007065.
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The new importance vested in corporate democratic
processes has raised the stakes for the construction of the polity.
Lopsided voting arrangements that give a small minority
disproportionate power have come under increasing scrutiny.4  Just
as “one person, one vote” resonates with fairness for the average
American, the phrase “one share, one vote” provides a powerful
slogan for shareholder governance in our corporate law.  The
phrase is appealing because it provides a system of governance
based on a reductive but equitable distribution: each unit shall have
the same power of control over the organization.  “One share, one
vote” has been described as “the most basic statutory rule of
[corporate] voting”5 as well as consistent with “democratic
intuition and liberal tradition.”6  Although the standard is simply a
default rule in most jurisdictions, most publicly traded companies
have adopted it, and it remains the presumptive norm.7
Corporate law scholars generally accept the “one share, one
vote” standard as the basis for efficient distribution of the
4 See, e.g., Times Investors Urged to Take Stand, Reuters, April 5, 2007,
available at: http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/05/news/companies/nytimes_board-
/?postversion=2007040512 (discussing concerns over dual-class ownership
structure at the New York Times Co.).
5 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 72 (1991).
6 Caroline Fohlin, The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in
Germany, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD:
FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 223, 262 (Randall K.
Morck ed., 2005), quoted in Colleen Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the
Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1347, (2006).
7 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 361 (1986).  The standard has been
increasingly popular in European states.  Guido Ferrarini, One Share – One
Vote: A European Rule?, § III.2.3, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 58/2006, Jan.
2006, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=878664 (“[T]he law and practice in
European countries is slowly converging toward Anglo-American corporate
governance standards, including one share – one vote.”).  And European Union
officials have pushed corporations toward “one share, one vote” in order to
“eliminate discriminatory treatment of shareholders.”  Tobias Buck, EU Seeks to
End Bias Among Investors – Commission Wants ‘One Share, One Vote’
Principle, FIN. TIMES (London 8th ed.), Oct. 17, 2005, at 1 (quoting EU internal
market commissioner Charlie McCreevy).
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corporation’s voting rights.8  According to the theory, shareholders
have the right to control the corporation because they own the
rights to the residual interest in the corporation (i.e., its profits).
Because all other stakeholders in the corporation – employees,
suppliers, customers – are entitled to their contractual claims
before profits are paid, shareholders are in the best position to
maximize the overall wealth generated by the corporation.9  The
notion that shareholder interests should be pursued as the ultimate
ends of the corporation is known as shareholder primacy theory, or
the shareholder wealth maximization norm.  The shareholder
franchise is one way of ensuring that the corporation pursues these
ends.  Moreover, the “one share, one vote” standard is the best way
of ensuring that these ends are pursued.  Each shareholder should
have one vote for each share so that all shareholders have voting
power equivalent to their interest in the residual.  This provides all
shareholders with the proper incentives to oversee management,
choose to accept or reject a proposed merger, and otherwise
maximize the wealth generated by the corporation.  Otherwise,
shareholders would have disproportionate interests in the residual,
resulting in disproportionate voting interests.
Critical to the success of this theory, however, is the notion
that all shareholders have the same interest – namely, maximizing
the residual value of the corporation.  Shareholder primacy theory
maintains that all shareholders have homogeneity of interest;
indeed, it is seen as a necessary aspect of the theory.  If the purpose
of the corporation is to maximize the residual, then the
shareholders must all agree with this purpose.  Otherwise,
shareholders may elect directors who will pursue interests apart
from residual wealth maximization.  Thus, corporate law theorists
have repeatedly emphasized the homogeneity of shareholder
interests as a critical assumption of the model.10
8 Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775,
777 (2005) (“[S]cholars have not seriously challenged the theoretical
underpinnings of the dominant one-share/one-vote approach to corporate
voting.”);
9 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF1, at **.
10 Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the Taekover
Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 464 (2005) (discussing the assumption of
homogeneity in other corporate law models).
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Recent developments in the field of finance, however, have
called shareholder homogeneity into question.  For example, new
derivative financial products allow stockholders to hedge their
financial interest such that they no longer have the same interests
as their shareholding counterparts.11  As a result, hedged
shareholders might vote against the interests of the corporation in
order to maximize the value of their derivative stake.  Conversely,
shareholders may retain “hidden” ownership of their shares, such
that immense voting power in the corporation can be pulled out
from seeming thin air when this voting power would be
instrumental.12  Such shareholders have greater voting power than
their reported stock ownership all would indicate; indeed, their
voting power may be much greater than their interest in residual
profits.  Based on these conflicts between shareholder interests,
some scholars have argued that the theory behind “one share, one
vote” is no longer valid and have pushed to exclude certain
shareholders from the franchise.13
However, while this particular type of competing interest is
new, competing interests among shareholders is not.  Shareholders
are not the homogenous share-value maximizers that the “one
share, one vote” theory envisions.  Instead, shareholders are likely
to have a variety of interests that potentially compete with their
interests as shareholders.  In addition, even shareholders with no
other financial interests may have different notions of how best to
maximize shareholder wealth or their individual shareholder
utility.  Instead of being a limited exception, the recent growth of
hedged shareholders is merely another example of how
shareholders fail to comport with the homogenized vision of
corporate law.
Moreover, even if shareholders were homogenous, their
single-minded focus on profits would not justify giving them sole
control over the corporation.  Easterbrook and Fischel, in their
11 See, e.g., id. at 778 (describing how equity derivatives may allow a
shareholder to reallocate their interest in the residual); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership,  79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 815 (2006) (noting that “[i]n an extreme
case, an investor can vote despite having negative economic ownership”).
12 Hu & Black, supra note HB1, at 836-42.
13 Martin & Partnoy, supra note MP1, at 778, 793.
January 2008] ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE                       5
classic article (and later, book) on shareholder voting, justified the
shareholder franchise as the best way to aggregate preferences
along a certain axis without descending into constant struggles
over power.14  However, their analysis misreads the literature on
social choice and preference aggregation.  The need for agreement
along a single spectrum fails to justify the elevation of shareholder
preferences above all others.  When we remove the assumption of
shareholder homogeneity and consider the actual conflicted nature
of their preferences, we can no longer justify shareholder
democracy based on the traditional rationales.
This paper argues for a reconsideration of the traditional
justifications for the “one share, one vote” standard, as well as the
limitations of the corporate polity to shareholders.  In Part I, we
draw on the voting rights literature more generally in discussing
the considerations that go into creating a system of political voting
rights.  In Part II, we discuss the shareholder franchise within the
corporation, its foundational justifications, and some problems
with the traditional notion of the homogenous shareholder.  In Part
III, we first discuss why shareholder heterogeneity causes
problems for the traditional efficiency rationale for the shareholder
franchise.  We then discuss how, regardless of heterogeneity,
preference aggregation theory does not require that only
shareholders have voting rights within the corporation.  In Part IV,
we begin the discussion of how preference theory and utility
maximization might be used to reconfigure the organization
structure of the corporation.
I. VOTING IN THE POLITICAL ARENA
A.  The Basic Structure of Voting Rights Law
Life is full of decisions.  Some are fairly simple, like what
one should order for dinner.  A preference for one dish over the
14 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 395 (1983); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF1, at **.
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others drives the decision.  Decisions made by groups of people,
though, are more complicated.  When forced to order a dish for a
group, we need some way of moving from individual desires to a
group decision.15  We need, in other words, a social choice
function.16  There are many kinds of social choice functions to
choose from— we could just order what one person wants (the
dinner dictator), we could flip a coin, or we could use an approach
that seems to better capture the preferences of the members of the
group, such as voting.  Most democratic institutions have taken this
third approach when it comes to translating individual preferences
into group choices.17  Indeed, voting is the sine qua non of
democratic decision-making.
When political institutions settle on voting as the preferred
method of preference aggregation, they still have many decisions
to make about how to structure the process.  Those decisions often
come to be embodied in a set of legal entitlements, or voting rights,
which collectively sketch the contours of polity. These voting
rights, though, are not unidimensional; instead, there are at least
three distinct facets to the rights to vote, each of which is necessary
to ensuring full democratic participation.18
15 The study of how we make such moves comes under the heading of social
choice theory, which has entered the legal literature under the guise of public
choice theory. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC
LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
16 The terminology here follows WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST
POPULIST: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).  A social choice function is a rule that
translates a preference profile (a set of individual preference orders, one for each
member of society) into a social preference order (a complete arrangement of
alternatives in order of their attractiveness to society as a whole). Id. at 18, 296-
97.
17 See NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 16 (1978).
18This taxonomy is borrowed from Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings:
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176 (1989). See also Grant M. Hayden,
Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1589,
1594-1602 (2004) (giving a brief account of the history of each aspect of the
right).  Other ways of parsing out the right to vote, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes,
What Kind of Right is “The Right to Vote”?, 93 VA. L. REV. 43 (2007); Pamela
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The first aspect of the right involves access— the ability to
cast a ballot.19  This is voting rights at its most fundamental, and is
what people are usually talking about when discussing the right to
vote.  But the mere ability to cast a ballot is not sufficient to ensure
meaningful participation.  One’s vote must be accorded sufficient
weight and must be combined with those of other like-minded
voters to give the voter an opportunity to influence the outcome of
an election.  Hence the development of the second and third
aspects of the right to vote.  The second aspect is the right to cast a
vote that carries an appropriate numerical weight, one that is
quantitatively undiluted.20  For most elections in the United States,
this means that the election districts must be drawn in ways
consistent with the principle of one person, one vote.  Even with
equal access and equal weighting, however, voters may be denied
meaningful participation though a variety of other political
S.Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993), are not inconsistent with this conception.
19 For a relatively recent history of the right to vote, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR,
THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES (2000).  For information about voting in the early years of the republic,
see MARCHETTE G. CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO
VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960).  For
information about voting rights in more recent years, with an emphasis on the
quest for minority representation, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofman eds. 1994); BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD NIEMI,
MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992);
STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-
1969 (1976); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,
1880-1910 (1974).
20 For background on this aspect of the right to vote, see ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS
(1968); REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968);
GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION,
POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); ROBERT B. MCKAY,
REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION
(1965); Hayden, supra note XX; Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One
Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213 (2003).
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practices such as gerrymandering and at-large districting.21  Such
practices, which may qualitatively dilute a group’s voting power,
gave rise to the third aspect of the right to vote, and are at the heart
of much of the nation’s voting rights litigation today.  A robust
understanding of the right to vote, then, involves several distinct
(yet related) components.  Full democratic participation depends
upon enforcement of all three aspects of the right.
B.  Theoretical Underpinnings of the Right to Vote
The political history of the United States is in large part a
chronicle of the battles fought over who, exactly, should receive
voting rights.  Should blacks be allowed to cast ballots?  Women?
Resident aliens?  Should urban and rural votes be assigned the
same amount of numerical weight?  What about full-time residents
and part-time residents?  Should Hispanics that make up a
sufficient proportion of the population be guaranteed a certain
number of representatives of their choice?  What about
Republicans?  The answers to these questions have been highly
contested, and many admit of no simple answers.
Even though there has been little agreement over the proper
scope of a particular aspect of voting rights, there has been some
common ground.  There has been a consistent appeal to certain
principles by both sides of most of these debates.  Sometimes,
those principles are too vague to provide much of a ground for
debate— references to “fundamental” notions of equality come to
mind.  But in other cases, these basic principles are a little less
slippery, and provide a better platform for discussion.  In this
subsection, we will examine one of these basic principles: the
relationship between voting rights and one’s interest, or stake, in
the outcome of an election.  We will then discuss the basic aspects
of the various proxies that political democracies rely upon to assess
that interest for the purpose of conferring voting rights.
21 See Hayden, supra note XX, at 1600-02 (detailing minority vote dilution);
Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV.
593 (2002) (discussing political gerrymandering).
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1.  Voting Rights and Interest
a.  Interest and Access
Debates regarding the most basic issue in voting rights— who
should be allowed to vote— are informed by many things.  But
chief among these is an assessment about the degree to which a
potential voter is affected by the outcome of the election.22  Those
with a strong interest in the outcome, with a sufficient stake, are
prime candidates for the franchise.  Those with little or nothing
riding on the outcome, on the other hand, are rarely extended
voting rights. Figuring out which people have a sufficient stake in
the outcome of an election, and hence a right to vote, is
contentious.  But there is an often an underlying point of
agreement— that we can make that decision based, in large part, on
the relative strength of one’s interest in the election.
This should not come as a great surprise.  Voting, after all, is
a social choice mechanism, a way of moving from individual
preferences over an array of alternatives (candidates, propositions,
dinner options) to group choices.  And this is done in a way
intended to maximize preference satisfaction.23  People with a
strong interest in the outcome of a vote, with correspondingly
strong preferences, are obviously the first candidates for the right
to vote in such an election.  People with weak or nonexistent
preferences with respect to the outcome of a vote do not have
much to contribute to this end— their lives, their interests, their
happiness, are not much affected by the outcome.
22 See Hayden, supra note XX, at 251-61 (discussing the relationship between
preference strength and various manifestations of the right to vote); Melvyn R.
Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of
Political “Interest” and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1982)
(discussing the fact that “‘interest,’ implicitly of explicitly, must be the
touchstone of the [Supreme] Court’s analysis” of several types of voting rights
cases).  We do not claim that this reason motivates all decisions to enfranchise
or disenfranchise people.  There are obviously people with strong interests in the
outcomes of elections (e.g., people with mental disabilities, children) who are
nonetheless prohibited from voting for other reasons, mostly having to do with
their competency.
23 Hayden, supra note XX, at 248-49.
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There are additional, related reasons for tying the franchise to
preference strength.  For example, because those with a strong
stake in the outcome have to live with the consequences, they may
be more likely to make better decisions.  They may, for example,
think more deeply about their vote, and may be more likely to
educate themselves on the specific candidate or issues at stake.
And the outcome of the election may be perceived as more
legitimate when those who are greatly affected had the opportunity
to vote.  The rallying cry “No taxation without representation”
trades on this sentiment.
There is, unfortunately, no way to directly test the strength of
people’s preferences in order to see who should vote.  We could,
for example, just ask people how strong their interests are, but
there would be numerous problems with that approach.  First,
while many individuals may accurately report that they feel more
or less strongly about the outcome of any election, there is no way
for them (or anyone else) to neutrally compare those reports with
those of other individuals.24  There is no universal scale upon
which to measure everyone’s preference strength and, even if there
were, there is no omniscient social scientist to peer directly into
everyone’s minds and make a proper assessment.25  Second,
making those kinds of person-by-person assessments by polling or
interviewing people would be prohibitively expensive, especially
when you consider the fact that all representative governments
would need to assess all potential voters.26  And, finally, we would
be worried about strategic misrepresentation of the strength of
one’s preferences, especially since something useful (voting rights)
would come with the expression of a strong interest in the outcome
24This is generally discussed as the difficulty in making interpersonal
comparisons of utility.  For a summary of the problem, see Hayden, supra note
XX, at 236-47. See also INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon
Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991); James Griffin, WELL-BEING: ITS
MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 113-20 (1986); Peter
Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and
Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 200, 238-
254 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
25 See Hayden, supra note XX, at 245.
26 You could not rely on some other proxy for strength of voter interest, such as
residency, for that would beg the question.
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of an election.27  Relying on first-person reports, then, would not
work, and has not been the way governmental entities have made
such assessments.28  They have instead relied on various proxies
for one’s level of interest in the outcome of an election.
There are both historical and contemporary examples
involving debates over the extent of the franchise that make this
point clear.  Many states at the turn on the nineteenth century
limited voting to white men who owned a certain amount of real
property.  These freehold requirements were supported by the idea
that those who possessed such property “had a unique ‘stake in
society’ – meaning that they were committed members of (or
shareholders in) the community and that they had a personal
interest in the policies of the state, especially taxation.”29  The
taxpaying requirements that replaced freehold requirements in the
early nineteenth century were justified on similar grounds— that
only those who shoulder the burdens of government should have a
voice in it (turning the traditional rallying cry on its head: “No
representation without taxation”).30  In both instances, economic
participation is seen as a proxy for an interest in the outcome of an
election, and thus a proper prerequisite to the right to vote.
Modern restrictions on the franchise are often justified on the
same grounds.  Take, for example, residency requirements.
Residency requirements are ubiquitous, and such an entrenched
part of the democratic landscape that they are rarely analyzed as
mechanisms that disenfranchise enormous numbers of people.
They go largely unquestioned because we think that residency
usually serves as an accurate proxy for one’s interest in the
outcome of an election.  The scope of most government entities’
powers is geographically circumscribed, and the belief is that only
those living within the territory under control of the entity have
enough at stake to vote.31  In those rare situations when academics
or courts challenge residency requirements, they challenge this link
27 See Hayden, supra note XX, at 240.
28 Except to the extent that voting is not compulsory in the United States.
Qualified voters could always just signal their lack of interest by staying home
on election day. See Hayden, supra note XX, at 258-59.
29 KEYSSAR, supra note XX, at 5.
30 See id. at 50, 131.
31 See Hayden, supra note XX, at 256-57; Smith, supra note XX, at 1159.
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between residency and interest, arguing that residency, or the lack
of it, is not an accurate proxy for the strength of one’s interest in
the outcome of the elections.32  Instead there are certain classes of
nonresidents— such as people who work in the jurisdiction, people
who own property in the jurisdiction, or people otherwise affected
by the entity’s actions— that may be sufficiently affected by the
decisions of the governmental entity to be entitled to vote.33  But
the underlying assumption— that only people with a certain degree
of interest in the outcome of an election should be allowed to
vote— is shared by all.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the relationship
between the right to vote and the degree of interest in an election.
They were most explicit about it in Kramer v. Union Free School
District, a case involving a challenge to a New York statute that
limited voting in school board elections to people who either (1)
owned or leased taxable real property in the district, or (2) had
children enrolled in the district’s schools.34  The statute was
challenged by a childless man who lived with his parents in the
district.35  The Court struck down the restrictions on the franchise
as both over- and underinclusive:
[A]ppellant resides with his parents in the school
district, pays state and federal taxes and is interested in
and affected by school board decisions; however, he
32 See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) (explaining
that “the imaginary line defining a city’s corporate limits cannot corral the
influence of municipal actions.  A city’s decisions inescapably affect individuals
living immediately outside its borders.”); Richard Briffault, The Local
Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN L. REV. 1115,
1132 (“Boundaries exclude people who may be interested in or affected by the
decisions made within the boundaries.”).
33 See Hayden, supra note XX, at 257.  For this reason and others, some scholars
have suggested decoupling voting from residency. See Richard Thompson Ford,
Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1173, 1187-89 (1996); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1909 (1994);
Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 324-25
(1993).  For a critique, see Briffault, supra, at 1158-62.
34 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
35 Id. at XXX.
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has no vote.  On the other hand, an uninterested
unemployed young man who pays no state or federal
taxes, but who rents an apartment in the district, can
participate in the election.36
The restrictions were problematic to the extent that they didn’t
correspond well enough to one’s interest in the outcome of the
election.  The underlying assumption was make explicit by the
Court when it explained that a state could indeed limit the
franchise to a portion of the electorate that was “primarily
affected” by the outcome: it just needed to demonstrate that “all
those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected
than those the [franchise] includes.”37  But the state’s goal— to
connect the right to vote with the strength of one’s interest in the
election— was proper.
With respect to access, then, it is fairly clear, as a descriptive
matter at least, that the right to cast a ballot is closely tied to the
strength of one’s interest in the outcome of the election.  Because
there is no way to directly assess the level of one’s interest,
however, we are forced to rely upon various proxies— property
holding, residency, citizenship, etc.— for it.  Debates over the
scope of the franchise are largely debates over how well particular
proxies match up with voter interest.  The underlying agreement,
though, is that the proxies should reflect the degree of voter
interest.
b.  Interest and Weighting Votes
There may be a similar sort of agreement with respect to
assigning numerical weights to votes. 38  After all, the strength of
people’s preferences vary widely.  At some point, we may decide
that their interests are strong enough that they should have the right
36 Id. at 632 n.15.
37 Id. at 632.
38 One would expect these two aspects of voting rights to be closely related since
numerically diluting a vote may have the same effect as prohibiting voting. See
Hayden, supra note XX, at 255.
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to vote.  But that simple, binary approach to voting rights (either
you have the vote or you don’t) doesn’t fully capture the range of
people’s interests.  Perhaps the weight of each person’s vote
should be calibrated to the strength of their interest in the outcome.
Everyone person’s vote could be assigned a relative weight that
reflects the strength of their preferences— thus providing some
optimal level of participation.39
If such a value underlay the law of vote weighting, this
would mean that, after a decision is made to grant the right to cast
a ballot, there would be an additional decision with respect to how
much weight to assign to each vote.  We should expect to see a
wide range of numerical weights assigned to people’s votes, one
that reflected the varying degrees to which they cared about the
outcome of the election.  Is this something we see when we look at
the structure of the second aspect of the right to vote?
At first glance, the answer appears to be no.  The one-person,
one vote standard, which assigns everyone’s vote about the same
weight, dominates the political landscape.  This could mean
several things (in addition to the fact that we’re just wrong and
something else drives these decisions).  It may reflect a positive
judgment that everyone has, more or less, about the same level of
interest in the outcome of most political elections.40  But that just
doesn’t make sense: we know that people have a wide range of
levels of interest, at least wider than is captured by a simple
decision whether or not to allow them to place an equally-weighted
vote.  Another possibility is that there may be something else at
work here, something that limits our ability to develop a more
nuanced vote-weighting system.  And given what was discussed
above, about the difficulties in making interpersonal utility
comparisons, this appears to make more sense.
As opposed to a positive judgment about the equal-strength
of voter preferences, the Supreme Court’s one person, one vote
standard may actually involve a negative judgment that we will
rarely have the type of information about preference strength to
assign more nuanced weight to votes.41  It’s our inability to
39 See id. at 248.
40 See id. at 251.
41 See id. at 251-52.
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objectively compare relative preference strength that drives our
reliance on the one person, one vote standard.  Of course, a
requirement that political institutions assign equal weight to votes,
just like a requirement about assigning differing weights to votes,
is itself a judgment about the relative strength of preferences that
cannot be grounded on neutral principles.42  But this may just mean
that the Supreme Court was fooling itself when it thought it was
developing a neutral, judicially manageable standard for
quantitative vote dilution (something that the dissenters to the
original malapportionment cases rightly argued at the time).43
This view is also confirmed, oddly enough, by an exception
to the one person, one vote requirement.  As outlined above, the
equiproportional standard applies to Congressional and state
legislative districts.  And it applies to local governmental units that
exercise general governmental powers— those that might be
expected to affect everyone within the jurisdiction in a similar
manner, or to a similar degree.44  But what about local units that
disproportionately affect identifiable groups?  The Supreme Court
first raised that question in Avery v. Midland County, where it
noted:
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit
of government assigned the performance of functions
affecting definable groups of constituents more than
other constituents, we would have to confront the
question whether such a body may be apportioned in
ways which give greater influence to the citizens most
affected by the organization’s functions.45
42 See id. at 249-50.
43 See id. at 250; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a equiproportional standard is just one among many
“competing bases of representation.”).
44 See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 489 U.S. 688, 694-96 (1989); Hadley v.
Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968);); Hayden, supra note XX, at 252-53.
45 Avery, 390 U.S. at 483-84.
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The Supreme Court was forced to confront this issue of special
purpose districts just a few years later in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage District.46
Salyer involved a sparsely populated water district that
covered close to 200,000 acres of farmland.47  The district,
governed by an elected board of directors, was in charge of the
acquisition, storage, and distribution of water.48  Participation in
the board elections, however, was limited to landowners, and their
votes were apportioned based on the assessed valuation of the land
they owned (a one acre, one vote system).49  This was challenged
as a violation of the one person, one vote requirement, but the
Supreme Court rejected the challenge and, in so doing, created the
special purpose district exception to the requirement.50  The Court
found that, in cases like this, such a system made sense because the
board’s powers disproportionately affected landowners (as
opposed to mere residents), and affected them in proportion to the
amount of land they owned.51
This exception to the one person, one vote standard may not
prove the rule, but it does give us some insight into its foundation.
The one person, one vote rule is the default, in large part, because
we think that voter interest in entities exercising general
governmental powers is more or less equivalent.  When we think
we have reliable information to the contrary— when, for example,
we think we have a good proxy for judging the strength of people’s
preferences regarding the outcome of the election— we allow
movement away from the default to a more finely calibrated
system of voting weights.  So we do, in fact, see a calibrated
response to perceived voter strength in our basic political
institutions.  We just don’t see it that frequently in the political
arena because we rarely have proxies that we believe are reliable
enough to make more subtle distinctions.
46 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
47 See id. at 723.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 724-25.
50 See id. at 730.
51 See id. at 729, 734.
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c.  Interest and Combining Votes
Once we ensure that those with sufficiently strong
preferences with respect to the outcome of an election have the
vote, and we’ve calibrated those votes, if possible, to the degree of
preference strength, there remains work to be done.  It turns out
that there are many ways to prevent groups of voters from
successfully aggregating their preferences.  The third facet of
voting rights— the right to a qualitatively undiluted vote— is
designed to prevent this from happening.  So does the concern with
preference strength inform this third facet of voting rights as well?
There are two reasons to think that it does.  First, to the
extent that the third aspect of voting rights helps prevent the
reasons driving the first two aspects from being thwarted, the third
aspect, at a minimum, is preservative of the preference aggregating
function of the first two.  For example, we are worried about
placing a large minority of voters with similar views into an at-
large districting structure that would result in the election of none
of their preferred candidates.  The at-large voting structure tends to
increase the likelihood that large numbers of strongly held
preferences will be completely neglected in the outcome.  And
we’re worried about it for that reason, so we make sure that
qualitatively dilutive devices aren’t used to thwart or distort
preference aggregation.  Thus, this third aspect of voting rights is
not inconsistent with, and serves end of, tailoring voting strength to
preference strength.
Second, the benchmark for claims of qualitative vote dilution
seems to involve some assessment of proportionality.  Every
election has its winners and losers— that’s how democracy works.
The difficulty in assessing claims of qualitative vote dilution is
separating out victims from mere losers.  How do we tell for the
purposes of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, for example, when
a minority group has had less opportunity to participate and elect
representative of its choice?  What is the standard for assessing
dilution?  While there is no simple answer to the question, almost
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all solutions depend, in part, on an assessment of proportionality.52
Proportionality is not strictly applied in most instances, and there is
even an express prohibition against a guarantee of proportionality
in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.53  Yet it is difficult to
conceive of a qualitative vote dilution standard completely
detached from it.
The structure of voting rights in the political arena, then,
involves a series of decisions about how to best aggregate
individual preferences into group choices.  Generally, we allow
those with sufficiently strong interests with respect to the outcome
to vote.  In cases where we have more nuanced information about
the strength of that interest, we allow entities to calibrate the
numerical weight assigned to those votes.  And in aggregating
votes, we worry about various devices that may thwart the
collective expression of these preferences.  Many of a polity’s
decisions with respect to voting rights, then, depend upon finding
successful proxies for the strength of voter interest in the outcome
of an election.
2.  Proxies for Voter Interest
The relationship between voting rights and preference
strength should, on reflection, be fairly obvious— after all, voting
is merely a method used to aggregate individual preferences.  Thus
decisions about who has the right to vote and how much weight to
assign to that vote are driven in large part by assessments of voter
interest in the outcome of the election.  Assessing individual voter
interest, though, is easier said than done.  There is no way to
directly observe or compare levels of voter interest, and merely
asking people how much they care about an election is
unworkable.
52 See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Borrding Omnipresence of
Proportional Representation: Why Won’t It Go Away?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 257
(1985).
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006) (“[N]othing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population.”).
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For that reason, those who structure and administer
democratic institutions rely on various proxies for the strength of
voter interest.  For political entities with general governmental
powers, we have tinkered with various proxies in the past— owning
property, paying taxes— and have now settled on a variety of
proxies such as residency and citizenship that better capture the
group of voters who are sufficiently interested in the outcome of
elections.  (For corporations, we have settled on stock ownership,
and in many cases have further calibrated the basic voting rules
with the one share, one vote system.)  The success of the voting
structures of both types of institutions depends, in large part, on
how well these proxies work.
In order to assess how well a proxy works, we generally look
to two features: whether it accurately reflects the degree of interest
and whether it is manageable.  The accuracy of a proxy for voter
eligibility depends on how well it describes the group of people
who have sufficient interests in the outcome of the election.  There
are two basic ways that such a proxy may be off the mark— it may
be underinclusive or overinclusive.  A proxy is underinclusive if it
fails to identify people with an interest in the election, and thus
disenfranchises them.  (Of course, a democratic entity could stitch
together several underinclusive proxies in order to more fully
capture the entire group of interested voters.)  A proxy is
overinclusive if it includes people without an interest in the
election, and thus dilutes the voting strength of those with a real
interest. When it comes to assigning weight to votes, the accuracy
of the proxy depends upon how well it is calibrated to the strength
of voter preferences.
Take, for example, some of the proxies that have been used
in the United States for voter interest.  The early property-holding
requirements were fine as far as they went, but they were
underinclusive, disenfranchising vast numbers of property-less
residents who had vital interests in the exercise of governmental
powers.  Residency requirements, on the other hand, seem to better
capture the group of interested people, since most people within
the geographic jurisdiction of a governmental entity— and thus
subject to its police powers, taxing powers, etc.— have quite a bit
at stake in the outcome of an election.  Residency, of course, may
be underinclusive in that it fails to capture nonresidents who work,
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own property, or have other interests in the jurisdiction (or
overinclusive since it may enfranchise people who are moving out
of the jurisdiction the day after the election and thus have little at
stake), but not nearly so much as property-holding requirements.
And, as discussed above, states are often prohibited from using a
proxy that is too underinclusive, too overinclusive, or both.  New
York’s attempt to use having children in the school system or
owning or renting taxable real estate as a proxy for interest in the
outcome of school district elections, for example, was struck down
as both underinclusive and overinclusive.
 Of course, democratic institutions, both governmental and
corporate, could develop more carefully tailored proxies.  While
there isn’t (yet) a machine to peer into people’s heads to assess and
compare their preference strengths, one could imagine that
extensive questionnaires could better determine one’s interest in
the outcome of any possible election.  The answers on those
questionnaires could then be frequently updated and double
checked for accuracy.  In the end, we would probably have a better
sense of who should be voting in a particular election than we do
now.  The problem, of course, is that such a system would be
unmanageable.  For starters, it would be quite costly and fairly
easy to manipulate.  Which brings us to the second characteristic of
a useful proxy— its manageability.
 The manageability of a proxy may mean several things,54
but, for our purposes, we merely mean whether it is realistically
workable.  There are many reasons why proxies might be
unmanageable.  They may be physically impossible (using brain
scans to compare preference strengths).  They may be too costly
(using extensive, constantly updated surveys).  Or they may be too
readily manipulated (relying on a potential voters’ professed
interest in an election).  In other words, something— be it cost,
fraud, or some other factor— may prevent the proxy from
accurately reflecting the preference strength of people its designed
to test.
54 In voting rights, the manageability of a particular voting rights requirement
might mean, for example, that courts will be able to administer the standard in a
neutral manner, without injecting its own biases into the case.
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Democratic institutions, for good reason, value proxies that
are easily managed.  In the political arena, freehold and taxpaying
requirements were easily administered.  There were already lists of
people who owned property and paid taxes, usually within
possession of the governmental entity holding the election.  It
would have been difficult to any individual to fraudulently add his
name to the list, difficult enough, anyway, that it wouldn’t be
worth the vote that came with it.  This doesn’t mean, of course,
that such requirements, standing alone, accurately picked out the
group of people who were interested in the result of a particular
political election.  But they were quite easily administered.  In the
corporate arena, stock ownership is also something that is easily
confirmed, which makes it a readily manageable standard for
voting rights.
It is more difficult to come by a manageable standard for the
more carefully calibrated proxies necessary to assign different
weights to votes.  Democratic institutions usually look to
something that’s both readily confirmed and, not to put too fine a
point on it, countable.  Whether it’s the number of acres owned for
the purposes of a water district election or the number of shares
owned for the purposes of a corporate election, the presence of
readily ascertained and countable acres or shares allows the
institution to administer the voting system.
The difficulty in finding manageable proxies for more subtle
assessments of preference strength may explain why equal
weighting is often the default rule in democratic elections.55  The
one person, one vote standard, for example, is nothing if not easily
manageable: one just needs to be able to count and divide.56  Like
some of the easily administered proxies for basic interest in an
election, however, there may be reasons why the equal weighting
of votes doesn’t come close to accurately capturing preference
strength.  As John Hart Ely noted, the one person, one vote
55 See Hayden, supra note XX, at XX.
56 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 510 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that apportionment is “far too subtle and complicated a business to
be resolved as a matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic”).
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standard “is certainly administratable. . . , the more troublesome
question is what else it has to recommend it.”57
* * *
There is a great deal of underlying agreement, then, that the
right to vote, and the weight assigned to that vote, should
correspond to the level of a voter’s interest in the outcome of the
election.  Perfect correspondence between voting rights and
interest, though, in unattainable, because we do not have precise
methods for assessing the strength of voter preferences with
respect to any particular election.  We must therefore rely upon
various proxies that imperfectly capture the degree of voter
interest, and strike a balance between the accuracy and
manageability of a proxy.  In this way, a democratic polity is
designed to best reflect the interests of those affected by the
exercise of its powers.
II. VOTING IN THE CORPORATE ARENA
The elections of democratic polities are designed to
aggregate the preferences of those with some interest or stake in
the polity.  Corporate elections are no different.  And just as “one
person, one vote” has become the mantra of preference aggregation
in our democratic polity, so “one share, one vote” has become the
rallying cry in corporate law.  Both standards share some of the
same strengths, from a preference-aggregation perspective.  One
share, one vote has a seemingly perfect correspondence between
one’s interest in the company and the voting power assigned to that
interest.  In addition, the standard appears to be easily manageable,
and it has the ring of fairness— votes to each according to their
share.
 One share, one vote, however, is not the “timeless and
natural” voting structure that it appears.58  It is neither a
57 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980).
58 Dunlavy, supra note CD1, at 1356 (discussing this perception).
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requirement here in the United States nor in Europe,59 and in fact
the percentage of companies with alternative voting structures is
increasing.60  Moreover, shareholder voting has gone through a
number of historical trends, reflecting the economical and political
concerns of different eras.  Indeed, other forms of business
organizations aggregate the preferences of their members in quite
different fashion.
More to the point, while much has been written on the proper
weighting of corporate votes, less attention is paid to the
antecedent (and more fundamental) issue of who receives the right
to vote to begin with.  The literature often assumes that the
franchise is to be restricted to shareholders alone and then
discusses how to best parse out voting power among them.  This
initial restriction, though, disenfranchises large numbers of
people— such as employees, customers, and suppliers— with
significant interests in the corporate polity.
Given that most voting systems are intended, at a minimum,
to aggregate the preferences of those with an interest in the
enterprise, it is curious that many groups with significant interests
in the corporate polity are completely disenfranchised.  Perhaps
this is so because it is difficult to design good proxies for their
interests— perhaps there is no accurate and manageable way to
pick out those (other than shareholders) with significant interests in
a corporation.  Perhaps the interests of non-shareholders are best
represented by legal relationships other than voting, such as by
contract (though it seems, at their best, such contracts would
incompletely capture their interest in the future of the corporation).
In any case, this curious question— why voting rights are restricted
to one group of interested stakeholders and, further, parsed out
according to the one share, one vote formula— requires further
inquiry.  And that inquiry must begin with a review of the basic
nature of the corporate polity itself.
59 Id. at 1349.
60 Marco Brecht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been So Little Block
Holding in America?, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE
WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 613, 653-57
(Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (noting that the number of dual or multi-class
share corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange more than doubled
from 1994 to 2001).
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A.  Governance in Business Organizations
When we think of a corporation, we generally think of the
collection of people and assets that make up its everyday business.
But in a legal sense, a corporation is a fiction; it is a legal entity
created by a government document that has no “independent”
existence.  Thus, it is perhaps more help to conceive of the
corporation as a legal structure designed to allocate rights and
duties among the collection of people and assets that give the
corporation life.  The corporation is generally formed for a
business purpose.  In the nineteenth century, corporations had a
specific corporate purpose within their corporate charter.61  Even
though no specific purpose is legally required today, most
corporations are formed by a certain collection of people with a
certain collection of assets who believe that forming the
corporation will better help them achieve a set of business-oriented
goals.  They could do this without forming a corporation, but
forming a corporation under state law in some ways helps them to
effectuate their goals.  The corporation is designed to facilitate
collective economic activity.
The corporation is not the only form of business organization
operating in the U.S. economy: along with corporations, there are
sole proprietorships, partnerships, business trusts, limited
partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability
companies.62  The complexity of these forms is usually seen as
existing along a spectrum, with the sole proprietorship being the
most basic and the corporation being the most advanced.63 What
61 NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM (2001).
62 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 2 (2d ed. 2003)
(including the joint stock company and the partnership association (in a few
states)).
63 Within the corporation category, closely-held corporations are sometimes
separated from publicly-held corporations, although they are formed through the
same state incorporation statutes.  Closely-held corporations are identified as
those with: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the
corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in
management.  Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328
N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975).
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separates the corporation from the other forms of business
organization?  Scholars have isolated five factors which are
considered essential to the corporate form: (1) full legal
personality, including the ability to bind the firm to contracts; (2)
limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by
investors of capital; (4) delegated management under a board
structure; and (5) transferable shares.64
In terms of governance, the two essential corporate features
are (3) shared ownership by investors and (4) delegated
management.  This structure is manifest in a tripartite set of
players: the shareholders, the board of directors, and the officers.
The shareholders are sometimes designated as the “owners” of the
firm: they have the right to receive residual profits as well as the
right to elect the board of directors.65  The directors are, in turn, the
locus of authority within the corporation; they are the
representatives of the firm when human counterparts to the
fictional form are required.66  The board does not generally run the
business, however; directors generally delegate this power to the
officers of the corporation.  These officers in turn select the
remaining employees.  The structure is hierarchical, in that
shareholders can vote out directors, directors can fire the officers,
and officers can fire the remaining employees.67
Other business organizations generally have more flexible
governance requirements.  In partnership law, the default rule is
that each partner has an equal share of the voting power, unless
decided otherwise by the partners.68  Certainly, partners are free to
set up alternative voting structures, and most sophisticated
partnerships have complicated methods of aggregating the
64 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-440 (2001). Cf. CLARK, supra note RC1, at 2
(listing four characteristics of the corporation: (1) limited liability, (2) free
transferability of investor interests, (3) legal personality, and (4) centralized
management).
65 This designation is something of a misnomer. See infra note ZZZ.
66 CLARK, supra note RC1, at 21.
67 Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note SB1, at 555-58 (discussing the
hierarchical nature of corporate structure).
68 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §
401(f) (amended 1997).
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preferences of their members.  But the default rule has continuing
relevance because partnerships may be created without an explicit
agreement between the parties.69  When the parties have not
explicitly agreed to form a partnership, they will not have
established a governance framework and thus will be given the
default setting.  Thus, even in situations where one partner has
provided substantially more money or labor to the partnership than
the other partners, all will have an equal vote in partnership
decisions.70
The “one partner, one vote” default rule can be wildly
inequitable, at least if voting power is meant to correspond with
one’s actual contributions to the enterprise.  As an alternative, a
court could conduct a simple calculation of the dollars invested by
each partner, and votes would be allocated according to the funds
invested.  Why has the law assented to such a blunt division of
power?  Perhaps most importantly, the default division of profits
and losses (the interest in the residual) is to provide each partner an
equal share.71  Thus, as in the “one share, one vote” system, the
(default) voting power is equal to the (default) share of profits and
losses.  In addition, a partner-oriented default rule is much easier to
manage than an investment-oriented rule.  A “one partner, one
vote” default allocation may provide the best mix of interest
aggregation and manageability in sorting out voting power
amongst partners.72
69 A partnership has been defined as “an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owenrs a business for profit.”  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1); REV.
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (amended 1997).  The definition thus includes
individuals who may not have intended to form a partnership. See, e.g., Bass v.
Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that “it is not essential that the
parties actually intended to become partners”).
70 The control rights in a partnership extend even to ordinary, everyday matters
of the business.  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); REV. UNIF.
P’SHIP ACT § 401(j) (amended 1997).
71 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT
§ 401(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 77 (Supp. 2001).
72 See Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 841-42
(2001) (noting that “[e]quality rules for management . . . suit very closely held
firms in which the partners' combinations of capital, service, and credit
contributions can be assumed to equalize”). But see id. at 841 (questioning
whether partner intent should sometimes overrule the default).
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Of course, “one partner, one vote” is only the default rule.
Partners who contemplate varying levels of input and interest will
generally construct a partnership agreement that allocates votes
according to mutual agreement.73  And there is no requirement that
each partner must have an equal vote according to that partner’s
“share” in the residual profits.  Instead, partners are free to divvy
up voting power according to contributions, seniority, experience,
involvement, and other factors relevant to governance.74 There is
no scholarly literature saying that partnerships are poorly
constructed if they fail to match voting rights to the residual.
The business trust has a similar flexibility in governance.
The common law trust has had a rocky history, as it has sometimes
been lumped in with partnerships,75 and other times it has been
judged to be a corporation in trust clothing.76  This differential
treatment has hampered the use of the trust as a business
organization.  However, the trust has dominated some types of
business enterprises, such as pension and investment funds.77
Recently, trust law scholars have argued that the business trust is
underrated and that new statutory trusts will provide a new venue
for commercial enterprises.78
The trust is generally recognized by its strict division
between principal and agent, as well as the strong fiduciary duties
assumed by the principal.  The trust divides its relevant
73 See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D.D.C. 1975)
(discussing how “statutory rules governing the rights and duties of the partners
are ‘subject to any agreement between them’”).
74 See id.at 988 (discussing the centralized management structure of law firm
partnership).
75 Cox & Hazen, supra note CH1, at 20.
76 See Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of the
Massachusetts or Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d 704, 729-30 (1978 & Supp.
2001).
77 See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an
Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.J. 165, 168-73 (1997).
78 Id. at 166-67; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research
Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 35.  There is an uncertain number of states
with statutory trusts. Id. at 35 (“The existing literature, such as it is, puts the
count of states with general business trust legislation anywhere from seventeen
to thirty-four.”).  In 1988, Delaware established a statutory trust to some fanfare.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801-3824 (2007).
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participants into trustees and beneficiaries (or “beneficial
owners”).79  Trustees manage the assets of the trust, and the
beneficiaries receive the profits of this management.  Because
trusts were traditionally donative transfers, beneficiaries had no
rights or expectations of control over the trustees, despite the
trustee’s obligation to act on their behalf.  However, the law did
provide for trustee oversight.  Under common law, the general duty
of trustees is to “exercise reasonable care in an effort to preserve
the trust property.”80  Trustees were thus liable for acting in their
own interest or for violating a duty of care far stricter than the duty
of care under corporate law.  For this reason, the trust was seen as
an inappropriate avenue for entrepreneurial enterprises.81
The new statutory trusts provide for more flexibility in
governance, and allow the parties to structure the relationship
between trustee and beneficiary as they please.82  Thus,
theoretically, the commercial trust became the completely
contractual enterprise; governance could be structured in any way
that the relevant parties desired.83  But such flexibility has thus far
79 See, e.g., id. tit. 12, §3801 (2007) (defining “statutory trust" as “an
unincorporated association which [i]s created by a governing instrument under
which . . . business or professional activities for profit are carried on or will be
carried on, by a trustee or trustees or as otherwise provided in the governing
instrument for the benefit of such person or persons as are or may become beneficial
owners or as otherwise provided in the governing instrument.”)
80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 232, cmt. C
(1990).
81 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Commercial Trust as Business Entity: Unraveling
the Mystery, 58 Bus. Law. 559, 575-80 (2003).
82 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(a) (2007) (“Except to the extent
otherwise provided in the governing instrument of a statutory trust, the business
and affairs of a statutory trust shall be managed by or under the direction of its
trustees. To the extent provided in the governing instrument of a statutory trust,
any person (including a beneficial owner) shall be entitled to direct the trustees
or other persons in the management of the statutory trust.”).
83 See Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New
Corporate Law, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 325, 326 (2001) (“Moreover, the
[Delaware] Act explicitly invites commercial and manufacturing enterprises . . .
to take advantage of this marvelous contract-like organizational form,
emphasizing its liberal contractarian approach and the freedom to write into or
omit from the trust documents anything they wish, or almost anything.”).
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not led to a rush of new firms organized as trusts.84  In part, there is
difficulty in establishing the background law and default rules for
this new form of organization.85  But there is no norm of control in
commercial trusts, and by extension no norm that beneficiaries
have a share of control proportionate to their interests.
The default rules are a bit more structured for the limited
partnership, the limited liability partnership, and the limited
liability company.  These organizations envision participants with
stakes in the residual who do not participate in management.  For
example, limited partnerships must make clear who the managerial
partners are, and who the limited partners are.86  Limited liability
companies have what is known as “chameleon” management: “the
firm can choose either direct partnership-type control by the
members or centralized control by managers that is closer to, but
not as rigid as, the limited partnership format.”87  Participants in
these enterprises have substantial flexibility in arranging the
division of ownership and control rights. Thus, there is likewise no
“one share, one vote” norm in these structures.  Instead, voting
rights are divided amongst the participants according to agreement.
Finally, closely-held corporations have the same basic
corporate structure as publicly-held corporations: the shareholders
elect the board of directors, and the board appoints the officers
who run the corporation.  In closely-held companies, however,
these roles often overlap, leading to a governance structure more
akin to a partnership than a large corporation.88  Many closely-held
84 Id. at 327.
85 Id. at 328.  Steven Schwarcz has argued that because of the background of
trust law, “[t]he degree to which assets need to be placed at risk in order to
satisfy the expectations of residual claimants thus provides a key to
distinguishing commercial trusts from corporations.”  Schwarcz, supra note
SLS1, at 578.
86 See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 7 (1916), 6A U.L.A. 336 (1995); REV. UNIF.
LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (1995).  However,
limited partners may be subject to liability as managing partners if they
participate in the governance.
87 Ribstein, supra note LR1, at 843.
88 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505,
511 (Mass. 1975) (defining closely held corporations as  having “(1) a small
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3)
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companies have different classes of shares as a method of
allocating control amongst different groups of shareholders.89  In
addition, shareholders may agree to certain voting arrangements,
such as the pooling of votes into a voting trust or agreeing to vote
along certain lines.90  These voting arrangements are often
executed to consolidate a group of disparate shareholders into a
majority or to provide protection to minority shareholders over
certain critical matters.91  Because of the limited number of
shareholders, closely-held corporations often have a shareholder or
shareholder with actual majority control.  Because of this,
corporate law generally protects minority shareholders again undue
“oppression.”  Although such oppression may relate to the stake in
the residual, it more often relates to the ability of minority
shareholders to partake in other aspects of the corporate pie –
namely, employment.92  Thus, the minority oppression doctrine
recognizes that even if shareholders are all sharing equally in the
profits, a majority may still be oppressing minority shareholders by
substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and
operations of the corporation”).
89 Preferred stock is particularly common in start-up corporations.  Venture
capital investors prefer to invest with preferred stock, which converts into
common stock with multiple voting shares if certain triggers are reached.
William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 892 (2002) (noting that
“[c]onvertible preferred stock is the dominant financial contract in the venture
capital market”).
90 See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note CH1, at 388-93; FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ,
CORPORATION LAW 486-96 (2000).
91 Perhaps the most famous example of such a trust involves the Ringling family
of circus fame. See Ringling Bros.— Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v.
Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947).
92 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842 (1976)
(finding “no legitimate business purpose” to the majority’s decision to suspend a
minority shareholder’s salary, fail to reelect him as a director, and fail to appoint
him as an officer); Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., 14 Mass. L.
Rptr. 379 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002) (minority shareholder terminated from
position as treasurer by majority shareholders).
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failing to approve a dividend93 or by not providing employment or
other opportunities within the company.94
Thus, despite the theoretical notion that a corporation is
merely a “nexus of contracts” between the various parties in the
firm,95 the corporation has perhaps the most specific and structured
system of governance out of all of the forms of business
organization.  Business organizations such as commercial trusts,
partnerships, and LLCs give their members lots of flexibility to
construct the organization as they so desire.96  The corporation,
however, is run by a board of directors which has been elected by
shareholders.  This conflict between the flexibility of the model
and the strictures of reality presents problems for the justifications
behind one-share, one-vote.
B.  A Brief History of the “One Share, One Vote”
As discussed above, other forms of business organizations
contemplate substantial overlap between those with an interest in
the residual and those with managerial control over the
corporation.    Such overlap is generally not possible in the modern
public corporation.  Instead, those investors who are given a
residual interest must entrust their funds to other individuals who
will actually control the enterprise.  In order to deal with the
greater diffusion of ownership contemplated under corporate law,
the system of governance allows the participants to elect a central
governing body, which then can make decisions in a more
93 See, e.g., Naito v. Naito, 35 P.3d 1068 (Or. 2001) (ordering the
implementation of dividend policy).
94 For a further discussion of the protection of minority shareholders vis-à-vis
the protection of political minorities, see Anupam Chander, Minorities,
Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003).
95 For a discussion of the “nexus of contracts” theory, see, for example, STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002).
96 This may explain, in part, the enthusiasm that nexus-of-contracts supporters
have for business forms such as LLCs and partnerships. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein,
Why Corporations?, 1 BERK. BUS. L.J. 183, 185 (2004) (challenging “the assumption that
the corporate form is optimal for publicly held firms”).
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organized and efficient fashion.97  Shareholders thus retain a
modified form of control in the power to elect their representatives;
their representatives, in turn, have actual control over the running
of the firm.
How, then, was this control to be shared amongst
shareholders?  The “one share, one vote” standard seems like a
fairly straightforward and natural way of breaking down the power
relations between shareholders.  However, in the early days of the
corporate form, shareholder ownership was not uniformly
distributed in the early corporate charters.  For much of the
nineteenth century, the common law of corporations provided for a
default rule of one vote per person.98  This method tracked the
default partnership rule, in which each partner has a vote no matter
his or her financial interest in the partnership.  One scholar found
that more than a third of a sample of corporate charters from 1825
to 1835 had a “one person, one vote” system of governance.99
Other charters provided a “prudent mean,” in the words of
Alexander Hamilton, in trying to balance between shareholders
and shares.100  Such charter provisions provided that the votes-per-
share would decrease as the individual shareholder got more and
more shares; a shareholder with five shares might get five votes,
but a shareholder with 100 shares might only get ten votes.101  In
establishing a “prudent mean” system for the first Bank of the
United States, Hamilton rejected a one share, one vote system on
the grounds that it would allow a few large shareholders to
“monopolize the power and benefits of the bank.”102
Over the course of the nineteenth century, however,
corporations moved decisively away from quasi-partnership
arrangements. By the end of the 1800s, most states had moved
97 See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note SB1, at 548 (discussing the
means of corporate governance through the board of directors).
98 Dunlavy, supra note CD1, at 1354.
99 Id. at 1354-55.
100 Id. at 1356.
101 Id. at 1357.
102 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK, COMMUNICATED TO
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1st Cong, 2d Sess. (Dec. 14, 1790), reprinted
in 2 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, app. 2032, 2049 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
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away from mandatory or default rules oriented toward limited the
power of larger shareholders.103   There was a brief period around
the turn of the century in which cumulative voting for directors
became a tool for protecting small shareholders.104 And in the early
twentieth century, states and corporations moved toward a one
share, one vote structure as a progressive response to the
increasing number of no-vote shares being issued.105  The term
“shareholder democracy” stems from these efforts to make sure
that shareholders had a viable vote, both through the shares and
through the corporation’s proxy machinery.106
The “one share, one vote” movement reached its apex in
1988 at the Security and Exchange Commission’s adoption of Rule
19c-4.107  The rule required companies listed on the major
exchanges to refrain from issuing shares with disproportionate
voting rights.108  Subsequently, however, the rule was struck down
by the D.C. Circuit and was never revived.109  Exchanges now
allow companies to issue dual-class shares and still maintain their
listings.110  Despite the failure of Rule 19c-4, however, the one-
share, one-vote norm remains a touchstone of corporate
governance.  Shareholder advocacy groups like Institutional
Shareholder Services look unfavorably upon dual class structures.
An unbalanced system of voting rights is likely to hurt a
company’s corporate governance rating, which may in turn affect
103 Dunlavy, supra note CD1, at 1358-59.
104 Id. at 1362.
105 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4,
69 WASH. U. L. Q. 565, 569 (1991) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Rule 19c-4].
106 Dunlavy, supra note CD1, at 1363-66.
107 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1988), vacated Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
108 At the time, some companies had issued a new class of stock, as a dividend to
current shareholders, that provided an abnormally large number of votes per
share.  However, these new shares were not transferable, and could only be sold
if they were converted to regular one-vote shares of common stock.  The effect
of such an issuance was to provide “lock in” power for long-term shareholders
and/or managers. See Bainbridge, Rule 19c-4, supra note SB2, at 566.
109 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
110 See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, 313.00(B)(1)-(3) Voting Rights
(2005).
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how institutional shareholders treat the company.111  The media
has also latched on to the one-share, one-vote refrain as a litmus
test for fair treatment of shareholders.112
This Article is primary concerned with the role of one-share,
one-vote not in practice, but in theory.  The norm is more
foundational in the economic theory of corporate law than it has
been in practice.  As discussed below, the norm connects the
shareholder franchise to the maximization of social welfare.  This
connection plays a critical role in justifying shareholder primacy,
the theoretical basis for the bulk of corporate law scholarship.
C.  The Theoretical Underpinnings of “One Share, One Vote”
If we consider the shareholder franchise along traditional
voting rights analysis, we must look at the voting system as a
preference aggregation system.  The purpose of allowing a vote is
to determine the preferences of those who are voting.  Elections
can be adjusted based on the strengths, divergences, and time-
sensitive nature of the preferences at issue.  But at root, as
discussed in Part I, the purpose of a voting system is to provide a
way for a group to sort its preferences along the axis of a particular
decision.
If we look at shareholder suffrage in this way, we
immediately are struck by the fact that it is only shareholders who
are having their preferences aggregated.  The corporation
encompasses the daily activities of a variety of different players:
directors, officers, executives, management, and employees.
Moreover, there are a variety of outside “stakeholders” who have
interests in the activities of the corporation, akin to shareholders:
bondholders, suppliers, customers, even the community at large.
111 See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, Google’s Weak Governance Rating, S.F. CHRON,
Aug. 24, 2004, at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/08/24/BUGBU8D46M1.DTL&type
=business (noting that “Google's low mark was largely a result of its dual-share-
class structure, which gives founders and other insiders 10 times as many votes per
share as outside stockholders”).
112 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, One Share, One Vote: One Big Test, N.Y.
TIMES, April 2, 2006.
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However, when it comes to aggregating the preferences of the
polity, in order to determine the leadership of the corporation, only
shareholders are invited to participate.  The shareholder franchise
only assesses shareholder preferences.
The primary normative justification for shareholder voting is
the theory of shareholder primacy.  Shareholder primacy is the
primary theoretical driver not only for the vote, but also for such
key concepts as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
Shareholder primacy essentially means that corporations exist to
serve the interests of shareholders.113  Put more specifically, the
theory mandates that the corporation be run with the goal of
maximizing shareholder wealth.
Shareholder primacy could simply be a democratic
legitimacy argument: the corporation has to keep shareholder
interests at the forefront, because shareholders are the voting
polity.  But this puts the cart before the horse: after all, who made
the shareholders the voting polity?  The choice of this group as the
enfranchised citizenry is what needs justifying.  A variant of this
justification is that shareholders are the corporation’s “owners” and
thus were entitled to the ownership rights of profits and control.114
However, the ownership justification is also doomed by its
circularity: who made the shareholders the “owners”?115  As
corporate law commentators have convincingly pointed out,
shareholders simply purchase a set of rights from the corporation.
The right to vote is made part of the stock ownership “bundle,” but
a stock could be constructed (and has at times been constructed)
without the right to elect directors.116  Even shareholders with the
right to vote do not possess many of the rights that traditionally
113 See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
277 (1998) (“The structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally
operate in the interests of shareholders.”).
114 The classic example of this perspective is Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG ., Sept. 13,
1970, at 32-33, 122-26.
115 See, e.g., Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002) (“[T]he claim that
shareholders own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”).
116 See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. W. L. REV. 687, 694 (1986)
(discussing the practice of selling shares without the right to vote).
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accrue to property owners— the right to exclude, for example, or
the right of possession.117  Labeling shareholders “owners” is no
more of a justification for the vote than is labeling them “voters”.
In their foundational work The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law, Easterbrook and Fischel provided a justification
for shareholder primacy beyond simple labels.  In looking to
ground shareholder primacy in economic theory, they looked to the
traditional economic utility rationale of creating the highest level
of efficiency or overall social utility.118  Shareholder primacy
theory argues that maximizing shareholder wealth will generate the
highest amount of surplus and thus will result in the greatest
overall social utility.119  This premise returns us to the “nexus of
contracts” model.120  Instead of being the “owners” of the
corporation, shareholders were one group of many whose contracts
with one another jointly created the fictional corporate “entity.”121
However, shareholders were the sole “residual claimants:” that is,
their returns were not payable until the other contractual
participants— creditors, employees, customers, suppliers— had
been fully satisfied.122  This perspective assumes that all other
claimants have rigidly-set contractual entitlements, such that
paying them more than their entitlement would be akin to a gift.
Because shareholders are not paid until these set contractual
payments have been made, all other claimants received their
contractual entitlements, and the shareholders benefited from the
maximization of the residual.  As Easterbrook and Fischel write:
As residual claimants, shareholders have the
appropriate incentives . . . to make discretionary
117 Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 Va.
L. Rev. 733, 754 (2007).
118 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF, at 35-39.
119 Id.
120 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF, at 1-39; Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976) (suggesting that
nature of firm as nexus for contracting relationships moots discussions of
precise corporate boundaries).
121 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF, at 36.
122 Id. at 36-37. This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigidly-
set contractual entitlements, such that paying them more would be akin to a gift.
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decisions. . . .  Those with fixed claims on the income
stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased
security) from the undertakings of a new project.  The
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and
incur most of the marginal costs.  They therefore have
the right incentives to exercise discretion.123
Although shareholders do not directly exercise this discretion, their
appointed agents do.  And these agents realize that they will be
ousted from the board and from managerial positions if they fail to
do their job in maximizing the surplus.
Thus, shareholder voting is not the cause of shareholder
primacy; it is instead simply one of the reinforcing mechanisms of
shareholder primacy.  Of course, as has been dogma since the
seminal work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, the shareholder
vote in publicly-held companies has not been a particularly
effectively way of maintaining shareholder primacy.124
Shareholder votes have been generally an empty exercise in
rubber-stamping the slate of candidates nominated by the board.
But this is an oversimplification.  At the level of the closely-held
corporation, shareholder votes are a much livelier affair.  Here,
shareholder primacy is generally effectuated directly by the
shareholders themselves through the vote.  Even in publicly held
companies, a majority or even a properly situated minority
shareholder has the power to appoint its representatives to the
board and thus control the corporation’s fate.
It is the power of a “controlling” interest125 that drives the
law and economics of shareholder voting.  At a traditional publicly
held corporation, the individual shareholder has little or no
motivation to monitor the company or even vote in the election.
But when those votes are amassed together into a controlling
123 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF, at 68.
124 BERLE & MEANS, supra note BM1, at 6.
125 A majority will have de jure control, but a minority interest may also have de
facto control over the corporation. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Comm. Sys., Inc.,
638 A.2d 1210 (Del. 1994) (finding ownership of 44% of shares to be a
controlling interest).
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interest, they can vote out the current board – often immediately.126
The shareholders’ votes can be amassed through the mechanism of
a tender offer – an offer by one entity to buy 50% or more of the
company’s shares.  The market for corporate control imposes the
market discipline necessary to effectuate the shareholder primacy
norm.  If the shareholders are ignored or unhappy, they can sell
their shares to another entity that can agglomerate the shares into a
majority holding.  This new majority holder then can take
complete control and make the profits that prior management had
failed to generate.  In this way, the market for corporate control
leads to greater efficiency: the shareholders can sell their shares at
a premium, and the acquirer can realize the benefits of control.
This potential for market discipline keeps the board and
management focused on the shareholders’ interests.127
The economic benefits of the market for corporate control
only occur if shareholders (as a whole) maintain control over the
board as well as the ability to transfer that control.  This is why the
shareholders’ interest in the residual profits is linked to their
control of the corporation.  Otherwise, the critical link between
having control and maximizing the residual would be broken.
“One share, one vote” is a “logical consequence” of the
theory of shareholder primacy.128  The “one share, one vote” rule
requires that each share of stock have equal voting weight with all
other shares.  In this way, the voting interest is equal to the interest
in the residual.  Shares with disproportionate voting power create
skewed incentives.  As Easterbrook and Fischel argue, “Those with
disproportionate voting power will not receive shares of the
residual gains or loss from new endeavors and arrangements
commensurate with their control; as a result, they will not make
126 DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 228 (allowing a majority of shareholders to
execute any action that may be taken at a shareholders’ meeting (including
removal of directors) through a written concurrence of those shareholders).
127 See Edelman & Thomas, supra note ET1, at 454 (discussing the importance
of shareholder votes in the takeover setting).
128 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF, at 73 (“Votes follow the residual
cost of the firm, and unless each element of the residual interest carries an equal
voting right, there will be needless agency cost of management.”)
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optimal decisions.”129  As a result, those with control will have the
incentive to seek disproportionate gains that do not directly inure
to the owners of the residual.130  The residual will no longer be
maximized, discouraging equity investment and leading to a
decline in societal efficiency.
A similar concern about incentives lies behind the prohibition
on selling a share’s voting rights separately from the share itself.
State corporate law does not permit a shareholder to disengage the
right to vote from the share and sell it permanently.131  In addition,
there are generally restrictions against buying a vote in a particular
election or bribing a shareholder to vote a certain way.132  Such
restrictions may seem counter to the general corporate law
preference for private ordering through contract.  But vote selling
is problematic for the same reason as disproportionate voting: it
disengages control rights from the rights to the residual.133  It may
make sense for an individual shareholder to sell the vote, given that
the value of the vote for any individual share in a public
corporation is close to zero.134  However, the sale gives greater
control to a holder that does not have an equivalent interest in the
residual.  To some extent, these problems are similar to those
129 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF, at 73. See also Bernard Black &
Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1911, 1945-46 (1996) (“The case for the one share, one vote rule turns
primarily on its ability to match economic incentives with voting power and to
preserve the market for corporate control as a check on bad management.”).
130 See Hu & Black, supra note HB1, at 851 (discussing concerns that
controlling shareholders without a commensurate economic stake in the
corporation are more likely to “tunnel” away a disproportionate share of firm
value).
131 See, e.g., Hall v. Isaacs, 146 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1958).
132 See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25-26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (noting that
individual instances of vote-buying are “easily susceptible of abuse” and thus
“subject to a test of intrinsic fairness”).
133 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF1, at 74 (“Separation of shares from
votes introduces a disproportion between expenditure and reward.”).
134 This is based on the notion that any individual vote has an extremely low
probability of affecting the outcome. See Yair J. Listokin, Management Always
Wins the Close Ones, at 13-14, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper,
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980695 (noting that “management
sponsored proposals typically pass easily,” with a mean approval rate of 85
percent).
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related to tender offers; individual shares are worth less when sold
individually than their per-capita value when agglomerated into a
control group.  But there is also a separate problem, in that those
selling their votes get all of the benefits of the sale but only a
fraction of the costs.135  At root, the problem of control without
equity interest would remain, and all shares would be less valuable.
Thus, the theory of shareholder primacy rests on the notion
that shareholders will improve social welfare by focusing on
increasing the corporation’s residual profits.  Shareholder primacy
is enforced through shareholder voting and by the market for
corporate control which uses the shareholder vote to effectuate
changes in management.  Essential to the theory is the notion of
shareholder homogeneity: namely, that shareholders all share a
common, homogeneous interest in increasing residual profits.
However, this essential aspect of the theory simply isn’t true.
Shareholders are not homogeneous in the interests – in new ways
as well as old.  The next section discusses the axes along which the
commonality of shareholder interests may splinter.
III. THE PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTION OF SHAREHOLDER
HOMOGENEITY
In their recent article on encumbered shares, Martin and
Partnoy state: “It is simply not true that the ‘preferences of
[shareholders] are likely to be similar if not identical.’”136  Martin
and Partnoy focus on the problems caused by equity derivatives
which carve up various shareholder rights into discrete financial
securities.  However, there are many ways in which shareholders
fail to share common interests – many opportunities for conflict
along what has been called “horizontal power relations.”137  These
conflicts are explored further below.
135 Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note RK1, at 39 (“Vote buying and selling can,
however, be inefficient in some situations because it enables the buyer and the
seller to realize gains while losses are incurred by other shareholders.”).
136 Martin & Partnoy, supra note MP1, at 778 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 405 (1983)).
137 Dunlavy, supra note CD1, at 1351-52 & fig.1.
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A. The Problem of the Control Group: Majority Rule and
Minority Oppression
The notion of shareholder homogeneity assumes that all
shareholders are similarly situated and share similar interests.
However, shareholders may have very different economic interests
depending on a variety of factors.  Perhaps the most fundamental
difference is the difference between a shareholder in a control
group and a shareholder who is not in a control group.  A
corporation does not necessarily have a control group – for
example, if shares are distributed widely amongst public
shareholders with no one holding over five percent.  But if a
corporation – public or closely held – has a control entity or
control group, then the interests of the majority are likely to differ
from those of the minority.
The primary benefit of control is the right to apportion the
benefits of control entirely to oneself while sharing the costs of
such control with the minority shareholders.  For example,
Corporation X has A as a 52 percent shareholder, while the
remaining shareholders B, C & D each own 16 percent.  If A
appoints herself as chief executive officer, she will get 100% of the
benefits of her salary.  However, since the corporation as a whole
pays the salary, A will only incur (by extension) 52 percent of the
costs.  Similarly, if A sells a valuable company asset to another
company which she owns by herself, she will have a strong
incentive to underprice the asset.  In her management of the
corporation, A will have a clear incentive to use her control to
drain away corporate assets for her own personal benefit.
The structure of the corporation’s control mechanisms is ill-
equipped to deal with this basic problem.  Most corporations are
arranged under a “majority rules” system in which each director is
elected by a majority vote of all of the shareholders.  In some
states, the “straight voting” system is counterbalanced by a system
of cumulative voting, in which each shareholder has a set of votes
to distribute among the entire slate of directors. 138  Cumulative
voting allows for minority shareholders to have representation on
the board.  But cumulative voting is relatively rare, especially in
138 See COX & HAZEN, supra note CH1, at 348-51.
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Delaware corporations,139 and even under cumulative voting the
majority shareholder still controls the corporation.  The system of
“majority control” sets up the fundamental problem of minority
shareholders’ lack of control.140
This structural problem has led to supplemental doctrines
intended to ameliorate or eliminate the effects of majority rule.
The duty of loyalty, for example, is an implied, mandatory duty for
all corporate directors and officers.  It requires them to act in the
interests of the corporation as a whole, rather than in their own
personal interests.  Because the duty applies to directors, it applies
by extension to majority shareholders, as their board representative
will be subject to this duty.  However, controlling shareholders
also have a duty of loyalty to the corporation’s minority
shareholders.141  The duty of loyalty has a structural element, in
that conflict transactions can find a safe harbor through approval
by a majority of shareholders or independent directors.142
However, in Delaware such transactions can also survive the
conflict through an after-the-fact “entire fairness” test.  Thus, there
is some flexibility and discretion in the administration of the duty.
The duty of care is also a mechanism for constraining the
majority.  The duty requires directors and officers to act with the
level of ordinary care expected of a reasonably prudent person.143
This rule is designed more to counteract agency costs, but it does
prevent the majority from running the company in a way that may
seem irrational to others.  However, the strength of the rule is
severely limited by the business judgment rule, which provides that
directors and officers are free to use their own business judgment
in making managerial decisions.144  As a result, the duty of care
139 See Jeffery N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at
Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124 (1994).
140 Note that this is different than the “agency costs” problem which seems to
(pre)occupy most corporate law scholars.
141 See Kahn v. Lynch Comm. Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, (Del. 1994) (“A
controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a transaction . . .
bears the burden of proving its entire fairness.”).
142 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 144 (2007).
143 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2003).
144 For an example of the discretion given to directors under the business
judgement rule, see Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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has largely become simply a mechanism for requiring directors and
officers to be appropriately informed about the corporation’s
operations and financial health.145  In the past, the doctrine of ultra
vires was also used to cabin the majority’s discretion on business
matters.  The doctrine held that corporate directors and officers
were not permitted to act on behalf of the corporation outside the
scope of the corporation’s purpose.  However, given the expansive
and non-specific nature of most corporation’s “corporate purpose,”
as designated in the corporate charter, the ultra vires doctrine no
longer has much effect.
Finally, the doctrine of minority oppression is designed as a
backstop in cases involving matters in which the majority
generally has discretion to operate.  The doctrine is generally
applied to closely-held corporations in which shareholders
participate in the company as both shareholders and employees.
Because there is no outside market for shares in a closely-held
corporation, shareholders cannot sell their shares and exit if they
disagree with the majority’s direction. The difficulty of exit has led
some courts to rule that shareholders in a closely-held corporation
must treat each other as more akin to partners and must treat each
other with the “utmost good faith and loyalty.”146  This duty is
defined ambiguously in order to capture a range of discretionary
activities that do not breach other fiduciary duties on their face.147
They generally entail participation in the corporation that is
controlled by the majority shareholder but is in some way expected
to be shared by minority shareholders.  As one court put it: “A
shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the
corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate
earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of
security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in
145 See, e.g., In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d
959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
146 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E. 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).
147 See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression,
48 BUS. LAW. 699, 708 (1993) (noting that minority oppression has been defined
as “burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct,” “a visible departure from the
standards of fair dealing,” and “frustration of the reasonable expectations of the
shareholders”).
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the corporation seek to defeat those expectations and there exists
no effective means of salvaging the investment.”148
In his article on the history of the shareholder primacy norm,
Gordon Smith argued that in the nineteenth century the norm
served as the foundation for the doctrine of minority oppression.149
According to Smith, notions of shareholder primacy were actually
generated to resolve horizontal conflicts between different groups
of shareholders.  As he points out, the seminal “shareholder
primacy” case –Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.150 – actually involved a
dispute between two groups of shareholders about the direction of
the company.151  In Dodge, the court required Ford Motor to issue
dividends to its stockholders.  The court used the language of
shareholder primacy to compel the controlling shareholder (Ford)
to distribute profits to minority shareholders (the Dodge brothers).
Refusal to issue dividends is a classic example of minority
oppression.  Smith pointed out that this development of the
shareholder primacy doctrine has much more to do with horizontal
relations between shareholders and much less to do with the
vertical relations between directors, shareholders, and other
corporate constituencies.152
Thus, there are a number of “softer” doctrines designed to
deal with the structural differences between the interests of
majority and minority shareholders.  As has been noted, however,
finding a balance between these interests can be difficult to
achieve, as the majority has legitimate interests in exercising its
right of control.153  These interests will conflict with those of
148 In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984).
149 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277
(1998).
150 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
151 Id.at 315-20.
152 Smith, supra note GS1, at 322-23.  Smith argued that ultimately the
shareholder primacy norm is largely irrelevant to corporate law and corporate
business decisions. Id.
153 See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (noting that “well
established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not always be treated
equally for all purposes” and arguing it is “inappropriate judicial legislation . . .
to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minority investors”); Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842 (1976) (noting that the minority
oppression doctrine should not “unduly hamper [the majority’s] effectiveness in
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minority shareholders, particularly over issues such as control of
the corporation, employment opportunities, dividends, and other
means of sharing the surplus.
B.  The Problem of Differential Voting Powers Amongst
Shares
As discussed above,154 the efficiency of the “one share, one
vote” hypothesis assumes that each share has the right to an equal
share of the residual interest.  Otherwise, voting shareholders will
have different incentives depending on the ratio of voting power to
residual interest.  A shareholder with strong voting power but little
interest in the residual will have different incentives than those
with less voting power and greater stake in the profits.
Easterbrook and Fischel noted that the “most basic statutory rule”
of shareholder voting was the default rule of one share, one vote,
and that this was “the same in every state.”155  They also claimed
that agreements to alter this default rule were rare.156  However,
there is evidence that they may have been writing at the high water
mark of such a norm, and that differential voting powers amongst
shares may be more common than in the past.157
Easterbrook and Fischel were writing in the wake of the
Security and Exchange Commission’s adoption of Rule 19c-4.158
The rule required that self-regulatory organizations, such as the
New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ, prohibit listed
companies from issuing securities that reduced the rights of
managing the corporation in the best interests of all concerned”); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1675, 1688 (1990) (“The application of strict fiduciary duties to close
corporations deprives controlling shareholders of the ability to manage the
corporation – to use their own property – as they see fit.”).
154 Part II.A. supra.
155 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF1, at 72.
156 Id.
157 Martin & Partnoy, supra note MP1, at 784-85 (noting that Easterbrook and
Fischel derived this conclusion from a “relatively stable period” in which the
New York Stock Exchange refused to list companies with nonvoting shares).
158 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1990), vacated Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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existing shareholders.  The purpose of the rule was to reinforce the
one share, one vote standard by prohibiting the issuance of shares
with disproportionate voting rights.159  However, the rule was
struck down by the D.C. Circuit and was never revived.160
Currently, the exchanges allow companies with multiple-class
shares to be listed; however, certain safeguards are required for
companies with these shares.161
Although scholars still call for the abolition of dual class
voting structures,162 they appear to be here to stay.  Several recent
shareholder controversies have involved corporations with dual
class shares.  Both the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal are controlled by families with shares that have voting
power disproportionate to their economic stake.163  Critics have
claimed that the controlling families do not have the proper
incentives because they do not have the same economic risk as the
other shareholders.164  However, such criticisms are subject to the
rebuttal that shareholders knew what they were getting when they
purchased the stock.  Indeed, that is the general justification for
multiple-vote or no-vote shares: corporate law should facilitate
159 At the time, some companies had issued a new class of stock, as a dividend to
current shareholders, that provided an abnormally large number of votes per
share.  However, these new shares were not transferable, and could only be sold
if they were converted to regular one-vote shares of common stock.  The effect
of such an issuance was to provide “lock in” power for long-term shareholders
and/or managers. See Bainbridge, Rule 19c-4, supra note SB2, at 566.
160 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
161 See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, 313.00(B)(1)-(3) Voting Rights
(2005).
162 See, e.g., Troy A. Parades, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance
Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1055, 1153 (2004) (arguing that dual class voting structures could be
prohibited as a way of protecting minority shareholder interests); MORE.
163 The Bancroft family is in the midst of selling the Dow Jones Company,
parent company to the Journal.  Frank Ahrens, Murdoch Set to Gain Control of
Wall St. Journal, WASH. POST, August 1, 2007.
164 See, e.g., Rob Keller, Dual Class Equity Structures, Risk & Governance
Blog, Risk Metrics Group, available at:
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2006/04/dualclass_equity_structuressub.html; Bill
Mann, Dual-Class Shares, Second Class Investors, Motley Fool, April 14, 2004,
available at: http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2004/04/14/dualclass-
shares-secondclass-investors.aspx.
January 2008] ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE                       47
private ordering, which includes the possibility that certain
shareholders will accept less control as part of the bargain.  Less
control probably means a cheaper price, and shareholders should
be permitted to make this bargain if they want to.  However, from
the perspective of shareholder wealth maximization, shareholders
with more control and less risk will have skewed incentives in
maximizing shareholder wealth.
In addition to dual class shareholders, there are certain
groups of shareholders – primarily holders of preferred shares –
who have voting rights that change based on the circumstances.
The primary purpose of the preferred share is to give the holder the
right to a regular dividend of a specific amount.  Holders of
preferred shares generally have no voting rights within the
corporation on matters such as the board of directors.  However,
many preferred shares have clauses that give each preferred share
the right to vote under certain circumstances, such as the failure to
pay the regular dividend.  Often, preferred shares are given some
multiple of common share votes for each share – for example, ten
votes in the election for each share of preferred stock.  Thus, once
certain circumstances trigger these rights, preferred shareholders
go from non-voters to super-voters.  Bondholders may also have
similar clauses of protection when, for example, the corporation
misses a payment.
Thus, the notion of a uniform shareholder polity is often
factually incorrect.  Dual class shares, as well as convertible
shares, provide control rights to groups that are not aligned with
those groups’ interest in the residual.  In fact, preferred shares
often give voting rights in order to allow the holders of such shares
in certain circumstances the right to trump the concerns of the
common shareholders.
C.  The Problem of Shareholder Vote Buying and Voting
Trusts
Corporate law generally prohibits shareholders from selling
their right to vote without also transferring the underlying interest
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in the residual.165  The converse is also true, although courts have
allowed for the theoretical possibility that the seller of stock could
retain the vote in order to protect a legal interest.166  However,
there has been a shift in the law with regard to bribery – paying a
shareholder to vote a particular way.  In the past, vote bribery was
not permitted; it was seen as a violation of a shareholder’s duty to
other shareholders.167  Over time, however, the rule has shifted to a
more permissive stance.
In Schreiber v. Carney,168 the company was seeking
shareholder approval of a corporate restructuring in the wake of a
merger.  The company, Texas International Airlines, needed
shareholder approval, and it needed majority approval from each
class of stock, which included not only common stock but also
three series of convertible preferred stock.  Jet Capital held a
majority of shares in one of the preferred stock series as well as
warrants for a large number of common shares.  Jet determined
that if the restructuring went through, it would incur a large tax
liability unless it had already exercised the warrants.  However, it
did not have enough cash on hand to exercise the warrants.  Thus,
it determined that it would have to vote against the merger.  In
order to resolve this difficulty, Texas International decided to lend
money to Jet so that it could exercise the warrants.
The Delaware Chancery court upheld the loan against a
challenge of vote buying.  The court recognized two principles
behind the general prohibition against vote buying: (1) protecting
shareholders against fraud and deceit, and (2) requiring
shareholders to exercise their own independent judgment.169  The
165 Hall v. Isaacs, 146 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1958).
166 See, e.g., Commonwealth Assocs. v. Providence Health Care, 641 A.2d 155
(Del. Ch. 1993) (expressing “doubt whether, in a post record-date sale of
corporate stock, a negotiated provision in which a beneficial owner/seller
specifically retained the ‘dangling’ right to vote as of the record date, would be a
legal, valid and enforceable provision, unless the seller maintained an interest
sufficient to support the granting of an irrevocable proxy with respect to the
shares”).
167 See, e.g., Cone’s Ex’rs v. Russell, 21 A. 847, 849 (N.J. Ch. 1891).
168 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
169 Id. at 24.  The court cited to Cone for the proposition that “[t]he security of
the small stockholders is found in the natural disposition of each stockholder to
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court found no hint of fraud or deceit in the instant case, as it was
in the other shareholders’ interests to bribe Jet into voting for the
restructuring.  In fact, Texas International had secured approval for
the loan from the other shareholders.170  The court recognized that
shareholders had different interests and that it may be in the
interests of certain shareholders to work with other shareholders in
developing a negotiated solution.  As for the independent judgment
principle, its traditional justification was that “by requiring each
stockholder to exercise his individual judgment as to all matters
presented, the security of the small stockholders is found in the
natural disposition of each stockholder to promote the best
interests of all, in order to promote his individual interests.”171
However, the court found that this rationale was “obsolete because
it is both impracticable and impossible of application to modern
corporations with many widely scattered stockholders.”172  Instead,
the court held the loan transaction to a standard of entire
fairness.173
Voting trusts are somewhat analogous to vote buying in that
two voters agree to bind their votes to each other, rather than to
their independent self-interest.  The Delaware corporation statute,
for example, allows parties to contract with each other to vote the
same way.174  The statute allows for a great deal of flexibility: one
party may agree to vote as directed by another party in exchange
for consideration.  In addition, parties may put their shares into a
voting trust that is then voted by a trustee.175  What these
arrangements demonstrate is that corporations are not simply a
mass of like-minded individuals who are all voting based upon the
promote the best interests of all, in order to promote his individual interests.”
Cone, 21 A. at 849.
170 Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 20 (“noting that the other shareholders “voted
overwhelmingly in favor of the proposal”).
171 Id. at 24.
172 Id. at 25 (quoting 5 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION (Perm. Ed.) §
2066). See also id. (“[A] shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment
in the matter of voting, and it is not objectionable that his motives may be for
personal profit, or determined by whims or caprice, so long as he violates no
duty owed his fellow stockholders.” (citation omitted)).
173 Id.
174 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 218(c).
175 Id. § 218(a).
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same self-interest.  Instead, conflicts between shareholders may
arise, and corporate law allows for mechanisms to resolve them
contractually.  Given the emphasis on private ordering in
corporation law generally, it would make sense to allow for these
private arrangements.  However, these arrangements contradict the
notion of shareholders as a mass of undifferentiated seekers with a
singular goal.
D.  The Problem of Hedging the Residual Interest
As discussed above, selling the vote separately from the
stock is generally prohibited, and vote “bribes” are subject to the
fairly rigorous “entire fairness” scrutiny.  However, new financial
derivative products are making it easier to vote shares while at the
same time hedging the residual interest that accompanies the vote.
In effect, shareholders are able to engage in “empty voting,” in
which they votes the shares without having the same financial
stake in the game that other shareholders have.
How does this work?  The simplest way is to purchase shares
in the company while simultaneously “shorting” the stock.  The
stock can be shorted through equity derivatives that increase in
value as the share price falls.176  Thus, a party will have
countervailing interests: the stock will still have its residual
attached, but the “short” position will reward a drop in price for the
stock.  If the short position is strong enough, the shareholder will
actually be encouraged to act against the interests of the
corporation in order to trigger a decrease in the share price.  There
are also less extreme possibilities that would nevertheless allow
shareholders to vote despite a complex set of interests that do not
overlap with other shareholders.  For example, in 2004, Perry
Corporation bought 9.9% of the shares in Mylan Labs and voted in
favor of a merger between Mylan and King Pharmaceuticals.177
Perry acquired the stake because it owned King, and it wanted
Mylan to agree to the merger.  However, Perry also hedged its
voting stake in Mylan through a series of equity swaps and other
176 Martin & Partnoy, supra note MP1, at 778 & n.14.
177 Hu & Black, supra note HB1, at 828.
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undisclosed transactions.  Thus, Perry acquired voting power in
Mylan while simultaneously hedging the residual interest in
Mylan.  Perry was sued by another Mylan shareholder  for voting
without true economic ownership; however, the case was rendered
moot when Mylan called off the merger with King.
Another potential for vote buying is through the borrowing of
shares specifically around the “record date” – the date on which
shareholders are “locked in” as the voting polity for purposes of
the election at hand.178  The purpose of this transaction is to
borrow the share specifically for the vote, and then return it to the
original owner after the vote.  Lending shares for a short period of
time is a fairly common practice; it is designed to facilitate short-
selling by making the shares available for sale when the short
comes due.  But if the borrowing is done not to facilitate a short
sale, but rather to allow the borrower to vote without economic
risk, the practice looks fairly close to vote selling.
Why would shareholders lend their votes to someone else –
someone whose interests might be counter to theirs?  The main
reason is money coupled with ignorance.  Financial institutions can
lend out the shares for a fee and make money while at the same
time keeping the share and the residual.  Given the lack of
importance or drama in most shareholder votes, these institutions
have not really focused on the possibility that borrowers could be
targeting shares not to facilitate a short, but rather for the vote.  In
fact, fund managers have been caught unawares by borrowers who
use the vote contrary to the managers’ interests.179  As the practice
becomes more widespread, shareholders will likely take more steps
to prevent “vote borrowing.”  But the complexity of many of these
transactions may make such monitoring more and more difficult.
E. The Problem of Management, Employee, and Pension
Fund Shareholders
178 Id. at 832.
179 Id. at 834 (discussing share borrowing in the case of British Land, including
the role of one fund manager who lent stock unknowingly to an opponent in the
contest).
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When considering the kaleidoscope of potential financial
interests amongst shareholders, there is one financial interest that
perhaps is more important than all of the others: employment.  For
most, the job is the single most important financial interest that
they have.  In a diversified portfolio, shares in one particular
company are close to irrelevant; it is the overall health of the
portfolio that matters.  However, one cannot diversify one’s
employment portfolio to any significant degree.  Thus, if one holds
a job and shares at a particular company, the effect of the vote on
one’s employment is likely to determine how one would choose to
vote the shares.
Certainly, there are similarities between the interests of a
shareholder and the interests of an employee.  Both wish the
company to perform well.  But within the organization,
shareholders and employees have different interests when it comes
to issues like the level of risk the company should bear, how
employees are to be compensated, and how the surplus is to be
split.  Particularly when it comes to mergers and acquisitions,
employees might have very different interests from shareholders if
the transaction will bring downsizing or worker replacement.180
Conversely, employees with shares as well as stock options might
choose to vote their shares so as to increase the potential for upside
risk.181  Stock options may have led employees to favor a strategy
of short-term stock appreciation without due regard for the
potential for down-side risk.182  In the late 1990s, employees may
have been more concerned about their stock and stock option
180 See Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations:
The Case for Non-Binding Employee Referenda for Transformative
Transactions, 58 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing employee
interests in merger and acquisition decisions).
181 Martin & Partnoy, supra note MP1, at 792.
182 Since stock options offer the chance for the holder to buy the stock at a
certain strike price, the options are worth the same (nothing) whether the stock
drops to $1 below the strike price or $100 below the strike price.  This incentive
scheme may have led to management and employees undervaluing excessive
downside risk, including the risk that financial misreporting would come to
light. See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of
Shareholder Primacy,  31 J. CORP. L. 975, 995-97 (2006 [hereinafter Bodie,
AOL Time Warner].
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holdings than their job; but as shareholders, they had different
interests than those shareholders who did not also hold options.183
Pension fund shareholders have received significant attention
lately for their increasingly visible activities in the realm of
corporate governance.  Teaming with other institutional investors,
pension funds have taken the lead in promoting greater shareholder
involvement in corporate issues such as shareholder nominations
for directors and approval of executive compensation.  For
example, AFSCME was the lead plaintiff in a recent Second
Circuit decision permitting shareholders to propose easier
shareholder access for board nominations.184  Some commentators
who are otherwise committed to shareholder primacy draw a
distinction between these activist pension fund shareholders and
other shareholders.185  Since pension funds are often run by unions,
commentators accuse pension fund leaders of pursuing their own
pro-worker agenda when it comes to shareholder proposals,
directors votes, and other shareholder matters.186  Manager
discretion is limited, as ERISA requires pension fund managers to
run the fund in the interests of the fund participants.  But there is
room within this discretion to pursue various agendas that have
ramifications beyond simply corporate governance and share price.
Specifically singled out are pension funds for government
employees.  For years the biggest player in the corporate
governance arena was CalPERS, the pension fund for
approximately 1.5 million California state and local employees.
The CalPERS Board is made up of directors elected by the fund
participants, directors appointed by the governor and other state
183 Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options
and Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 546-50 (2003).
184 American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. American Intern.
Group, Inc. 462 F.3d 121, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2006).
185 See Larry Ribstein, The “shareholder democracy” scam, Ideoblog, Oct. 27,
2006, at http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/10/the_shareholder.html.
(“It should be obvious to anybody who cares to look past the rhetoric that the
unions are seeking bargaining leverage on behalf of their members, and to
ensure their own survival.  They are not seeking to represent the interests of
investors generally.”).
186 Editorial, Conflicted in California, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2004, at A18
(complaining about labor’s efforts to “hijack” corporate governance for their
own ends ).
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officials, and ex officio members who are state officials or agency
appointees.187  CalPERS has long been active in corporate
governance and has its own “Focus List” of companies that had
questionable corporate governance practices.188  However,
CalPERS has been criticized for pursuing its governance agendas
overzealously and for caring more about workers’ rights than
profits.  For example, the CalPERS corporate governance
campaign against Safeway was characterized as a “jihad”; critics
maintained it was a response to Safeway’s harsh stance in labor
negotiations, rather than to real concerns about
underperformance.189  In addition, some critics have accused
CalPERS of using its power to advance the political interests of
those who serve on its board.190
Despite the potential conflicts between employee-affiliated
shareholders and the other shareholders, commentators have not
called for such shareholders to be deprived of the franchise.  And
for the most part, the law has encouraged management and
employee ownership of equity interests in their corporation.  In
fact, the notion of “pay for performance” led to the exponential
growth of stock options as a compensation device throughout the
1990s.191  Agency costs would be reduced and investors would feel
more secure, it was argued, if investors knew that the managers
also had their income riding on the success of the stock.  But such
187 See CalPers, Structure and Responsibility, at:
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/organization/board/structure-
responsibilities.xml.
188 CalPERS, 2007 Focus List, at: http://www.calpers-
governance.org/alert/focus/2007/default.asp.
189 Editorial, Conflicted in California, supra note WSJ1, at A18 (“Ostensibly
Calpers is upset about underperformance, but the real problem seems to be the
tough stance the grocery chain took against labor during a recent strike.”).
190 Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, CalPERS Targets Directors Who Neglect
Holders, WALL ST. J., 2004 (“The campaign is being fueled partly by the
political ambitions of Phil Angelides, California's state treasurer and a Calpers
board member, who is considering running for governor of California in
2006.”). See also Sundeep Tucker, Few Mourn Belligerent President’s
Departure, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004 (discussing the firing of former CalPERS
president Sean Harrigan for, in part, “going off on political tangents”).
191 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives--It's Not How Much
You Pay, But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990).
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shareholders clearly have different interests than their non-
employee counterparts.
F.  The Problem of Defining “Wealth Maximization”
The assumption behind the “one share, one vote” norm is that
shareholders have a uniform interest in wealth maximization.
Since all shareholders are entitled to part of the residual, they all
have an interest in maximizing the size of that residual.  The notion
that shareholder wealth maximization is not only a goal for the
corporation, but in fact the only legitimate goal, has become the
dominant normative theory of the corporation.  Indeed, Hansmann
and Kraakman have proclaimed the primacy of this view: “There is
no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value.”192
However, even assuming a mass of shareholders with no
other complications or interests, there are still difficulties in
implementing the notion of shareholder wealth maximization.  The
main problem is: when?  What is the time horizon for wealth
maximization?  Hansmann and Kraakman specify “long-term
shareholder value” but do not define it.  And in fact, shareholders
have radically different time horizons for the “maximization” of
their shareholder wealth.193  There may be some shareholders who
buy the stock at the IPO and hold it until it passes to their heirs and
assigns.  But there are other shareholders who hold the stock for a
day, a week, a month.  There are some shareholders who also have
options – they want to max out on the stock at the option exercise
date.194 There are some shareholders who must sell the share once
192 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note HK1, at 439.
193 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power,
53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 579-83 (2006) (discussing the different financial of
interests of short-term and long-term shareholders).
194 And they want to get the option at the stock’s lowest point.  Many companies
have been accused of gaming the system by backdating the option’s strike date
to a day with a lower price.  For a discussion of the backdating scandal, see
David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations
on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561 (2007).
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it drops out of a particular index.195  There are some shareholders
who have yearly or quarterly profit margins to meet, and they need
the stock to rise to meet those horizons.  There are some
shareholders who buy the stock looking to take it over, and then
either buy all of the stock or walk away; other shareholders buy the
stock on a bet that the takeover attempt will succeed.
Ultimately, shareholders may have very different notions of
what “wealth maximization” means.  Let us take, for example, a
corporation whose shares have been trading at $35.  A takeover
firm offers shareholders $45 for the stock.  The board believes that,
if this tender offer is fought, shareholders will eventually get $50
for their shares within two months.  Or, the board believes that
technology in development will eventually lead the stock to be
worth $100 two years from now, if the current management
remains in place.  However, if the technology fails, the shares will
be worth $20.  What is the best path towards wealth maximization?
Believers in a strong efficient capital markets hypothesis will argue
that the $45 is the best choice, as will short-term shareholders.  But
shareholders with a medium-term horizon may want the board to
resist and shoot for the $50.  Those with even longer term horizons
may hope the board fights off the offer entirely and remains in
place, shooting for the $100 share price down the road.
Because uncertainties multiply as the time horizon lengthens,
shareholder primacy becomes more and more meaningless as it
stretches from short to long.  Paying high wages, to employees or
corporate management, can be justified based on retention of key
talent or reduction in turnover.  Customer good will justifies
slashed prices or expensive research and development.  As one
commentator has argued, “the mantra of shareholder wealth
maximization has no distinctive meaning and policy implications if
195 Index funds track a particular index; they must manage the fund to mirror the
composition of the index. See Shimon B. Edelstein, Note, Indexing Capital
Gains for Inflation: The Impacts of Recent Inflation Trends, Mutual Fund
Financial Intermediation, and Information Technology, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 783,
811-12 (1999) (discussing index funds); Peter N. Hall, Note, Bucking the Trend:
The Unsupportability of Index Provider’s Imposition of Licensing Fees for
Unlisted Trading of Exchange Traded Funds, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1126
(2004) (describing the composition of exchange traded funds, which may track
certain indices by having a sampling of stock from a particular index).
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it is not interpreted to mean maximization of short-term value.”196
However, maximization of short-term shareholder value leads to
short-time horizons that can cripple business planning and
stability.  Moreover, a short-term focus encourages corporate fraud
and misreporting designed to bolster the stock price now (the
possibly bad consequences to come later).197
In addition, shareholders with a diversified portfolio have
different interests than shareholders with most of their wealth tied
up in one company.198  Fully diversified shareholders, who have
been referred to as “universal owners,”199 have a stake in corporate
success as a whole.  Their notion of wealth maximization will be
quite different from a shareholder who has invested entirely in a
particular company.  Scholars have argued that portfolio
shareholders prefer a policy of portfolio value maximization, rather
than individual firm value maximization.200  In contrast,
undiversified shareholders have an incentive to oppose transactions
that maximize wealth for all shareholders (by increasing the value
of one firm by more than the decrease in value at the shareholders’
firm).201  Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi have used this
argument in support of a hands-off approach to vote selling and
buying.202  According to this view, vote buying may be necessary
to allow diversified shareholders to pull off transactions that
actually hurt shareholders at the company.  The portfolio
shareholders would buy the votes necessary to carry off the
transaction as long as the transaction creates overall positive value
for the portfolio.203
196 Margaret M. Blair, Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language
Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 890 (2003).
197 Bodie, AOL Time Warner, supra note MB1, at 997-98.
198 Anabtawi, supra note IA1, at 583-85.
199 JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY
CAPITALISM 3, 21 (2000).
200 Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives
in a World with Diversified Shareholders/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANALYSIS 43, 44 (1996).
201 Id.
202 Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce Kobayashi, Outsider Trading as an Incentive
Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 44-45 (2006).
203 Id. (noting that such “costly manipulation” may be useful in overcoming
“interference from self-interested managers or undiversified shareholders”).
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 The notion of maximization of portfolio value strikes at the
heart of the shareholder primacy norm.  Under this theory, social
wealth will not be maximized if each firm seeks to maximize
returns for its own shareholders.   Instead, social wealth depends
not on the actions of individual companies, but the actions of all
companies in the economy.  What this means is that in some
instances, it would be more efficient (on a societal level) for a
company to do something that decreased its own shareholders’
wealth.  Yet directors would be violating their fiduciary duties if
they went forward with the transaction, since it harms the
company’s shareholders. This example demonstrates yet another
axis on which shareholders split into different groups based on
different interests.
G.  The Problem of “Corporate Social Responsibility”
Finally, we must consider the possibility that shareholders
will, in fact, choose something other than wealth maximization as
their goal for the corporation.  The goal of wealth maximization is
assumed, on both descriptive and normative grounds, to be the sole
corporate purpose that shareholders desire.  Descriptively,
shareholders are assumed to be rational actors, and thus are
assumed to desire the maximization of their utility.  Although
scholars recognize that utility can come in many forms, the role of
“shareholder” is seen as easily translatable into a wealth-based
utility model.  In other words, since shareholders invest money in
stock in order to make more money (through dividends and
appreciation of stock price), their utility in holding the stock is
derived solely from their financial appreciate from the stock.  This
reality is also normatively the optimal outcome, since (economic
theory provides) self-interested shareholders will push to maximize
the corporation’s residual profits, which will maximize the social
wealth generated by the corporation.
While many have questioned the normative story of
shareholder wealth maximization, it has been assumed to correctly
portray the reality of shareholder interests.  However, there is
increasing evidence that not all shareholders maximize their utility
through a program of shareholder wealth maximization.  Instead,
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some shareholder may gain utility through lower profits but higher
levels of some other good.  There are a few anecdotal episodes of
this occurring at individual companies.  For example, a number of
Disney shareholders hold the stock because of their fondness for
Disney animation, particularly the historical works such as Bambi
and Snow White.204  These shareholders supported the efforts of
Roy Disney, the nephew of Walt Disney, to restore and maintain
the company’s tradition of animation and family entertainment.205
Many of these shareholders attend annual meetings in order to
celebrate their association with the company.206  And they may
have played an important role in the no confidence vote against
Michael Eisner in 2004, in which 43% of shareholders voted to
withhold their votes from him.207  Eisner had angered some
traditionalists by diversifying Disney’s holdings and failing to
continue Disney’s animation successes of the 1990s.208
Beyond these individual instances there is a larger
phenomenon under the rubric of “corporate social responsibility”
(CSR).  The CSR movement seeks to bring social, ideological, or
political principles beyond profit maximization to bear on
corporate decisionmaking.  Proponents of the movement believe
that corporations bear social responsibility for their actions beyond
what the law may require.  And they seek to influence corporate
204 See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Roy Disney’s Quest, WASH. POST, Feb 21, 2004, at
A1 (noting that Disney stock “is widely held by individual shareholders”); Peter
J. Howe, Shareholders Hold the Key to the Kingdom, Boston Globe, March 3,
2004 (describing “hundreds of thousands of Disney fanatics who also own
stock”); Obsessive Fans Join the Disney Proxy Fight, ASSOC. PRESS, March 3,
2004 (“. . .[H]ardcore Disney fans own stock in the object of their devotion.
Those stakes may be just a few shares apiece, but multiplied by thousands of
fans across the county, they help make Disney one of the most widely held
stocks on Main Street.”).
205 Howe, supra note PH1.
206 JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEYWAR 508 (2005) (discussing the thousands of
shareholders who attended the 2004 shareholders meeting).
207 Kenneth N. Gilpin, Disney Dissidents Rebuke Eisner, Denying Him 43% of
the Vote, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 2004.
208 See id. (“During the course of his remarks, Roy Disney suggested that under
Mr. Eisner's direction the Disney name and its products had lost their luster and
unique character.”).
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behavior so that concerns such as worker rights, the environment,
poverty, and illness become factors in management’s calculus.
As individuals, most shareholders do not generally have
sufficient power to justify the time and energy required to vote
their shares according to their overall social utility, as opposed to
just their wealth.  However, increasingly investors are putting their
money into “socially responsible” funds – funds that invest in
companies that meet certain social responsibilities targets or
thresholds.209  By the end of 2005, approximately $2.3 trillion was
invested in funds targeted towards socially responsible companies,
up from $635 billion in 1995.210  Such funds often underperform
the market as a whole.211  However, their popularity attests to the
desires of some investors to promote companies that adhere to
certain principles beyond wealth maximization.  As the number of
socially responsible funds increases, investment houses are
diversifying the types of such funds to appeal to a broader variety
of investors.  Along with funds favoring companies based on labor
or environmental policies, there are funds that invest based on
Catholic social teaching as well as funds that invest in companies
based on the money that those companies give to Democratic
candidates.212
Socially responsible investing is just a small share of the
market now, and it may be that the overwhelming desire of most
shareholders is simple wealth maximization.  But it may also be
that the new era of socially responsible consumerism and
investing, when coupled with the shareholder democracy
movement, will lead shareholders to support policies that do not
209 See Henry Blodget, The Conscientious Investor, ATLANTIC, October 2007, at
78.
210 Jeff Brown, Save the Earth, Sacrifice your Returns?, WASH. POST, May 13,
2007, at F01.  Of course, this may be so because “performance” is measured
along one metric— profitability— that fails to capture additional investor or
societal utility generated by investment in such funds.
211 Id. (“For the 12 months ended April 30, for example, such funds investing in
big-company stocks returned 11.63 percent, compared with 12.28 percent for all
big-stock funds. For funds investing in mid-size companies, socially minded
versions returned 7.65 percent over the period, compared with 10.24 percent for
all funds.”).
212 Id.; see also Blodget, supra note HB1, at 80-82 (discussing the categorization
difficulties of socially responsible investing).
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directly correlate with wealth maximization.  In the end, a system
based on and legitimated by shareholder control must admit of the
possibility that shareholders may choose not to maximize
profits.213  If shareholders choose this route more frequently, a
normative theory that justifies the shareholder vote based on the
efficiency of shareholder wealth maximization may in fact find
that the shareholder vote is no longer the best tool for achieving
shareholder wealth maximization.
H.  The Problem of Market Hegemony
The norm of shareholder wealth maximization may actually
reveal a shortcoming in the application of economic theory
shareholder voting (and many other aspects of commercial
behavior).214  Most economic models, for example, treat profit
maximization as the sole objective of corporations; non-market values
are to be (appropriately) ignored.215  And, indeed, there is plenty of
evidence that most corporations really do make decisions based on
these profit-maximizing considerations.216  Shareholders tend to vote
on those considerations.217  Consumers, too, tend to focus on bottom-
line considerations then making their marketplace decisions.  Factors
such as price and product quality tend to dominate consumer choice;
the “social values” of the corporations figures little, if it all, in those
213 Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2006) (“Managers can
promote shareholders' interests without maximizing profits to the extent the
shareholders have some objective other than profit maximization.”).
214 Much of the thinking in this subsection draws upon the thinking of Stephen
Ellis, Market Hegemony and Economic Theory (forthcoming 2008).
215 See, e.g., Norman Barry, Controversy: Do Corporations Have Any
Responsibility Beyond Making a Profit?, 3 J. MARKETS & MORALITY 100
(2000); Patrick Primeaux & John Steiber, Profit Maximization: The Ethical
mandate of Business, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 287 (1994).
216 See, e.g., Sandra Black & Elizabeth Brainerd, Importing Inequality?  The
Impact of Globalization on Gender Discrimination, 57 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
540 (2004); Ann Schwartz-Miller & Wayne Talley, Motor Bus Deregulation
and the Gender Wage Gap: A Test of the Becker Hypothesis, 26 E. ECON. J. 145
(2000).
217 See Ellis, supra note XX.
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decisions.218  Everyone, it seems, focuses on the bottom line when
acting in market contexts.  This is in marked contrast, by the way, to
how people behave in political elections— indeed, it has been
suggested that people’s votes in political elections are driven by
generalized “values” while their votes in the marketplace are driven by
individual “tastes.”219
Markets, then, are hegemonic: people act for personal gain, and
other values are only reflected in what they do with that gain.220  Both
proponents and critics of markets agree on this point— their
disagreement turns on whether this is a good or a bad thing.221  Either
way, however, economic theory should be able to account for the fact
of market hegemony.  The traditional explanation is that acting on
non-market values (social values, prejudices) is costly, and market
competition drives out high-cost competitors.222  But this is just bad
economics.  Standard economic theory tells us that markets should
reflect consumer values, not shape them.  And those preferences, taken
as given, show that people care about a large variety of things, many
of which are not self-focused.223  While economic theory does a good
job explaining what happens when people act solely on bottom line
considerations, this just shows that the theory presupposes market
hegemony, not that it explains it.
Standard economic theory may not give a good account of
market hegemony because it posits that people are consulting all of
their desires and beliefs when making decisions. In other words, their
utility functions are univocal and fixed (or, to the extent they change,
they change slowly).224  For that reason, economic theory lacks the
resources to explain why, for example, people appear to consult their
“other-regarding” values in some (non-market) situations and not in
218 Lois Mohr et al., Do Consumers Expect Companies to be Socially
Responsible?  The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Buying
Behavior, 35 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 45, 67 (2001).
219 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed.
1970).
220 See Ellis, supra note XX
221 See id.
222 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 109-10 (1982).
223 See Ellis, supra note XX.
224 See Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After
Behavioral Economics, 55 KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007).
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other (market) situations.  The “on-again, off again” nature of people’s
preferences is also unlikely to be adequately captured by some of the
basic extensions of economics, like the various versions of the
multiple-selves model.225  A more convincing extension of economics,
however, is one that posits that people do not consult their entire set of
preferences when making decisions, but instead rely on a proper subset
of their interests.226  This would account for the highly contextual
nature of action generally, and further explain why people seem to be
attending to only bottom-line considerations when making decisions in
market contexts.
Perhaps this just confirms what was discussed above: that
restricting voting rights to shareholders drives the wealth
maximization norm rather than the other way around.  When people
are voting as shareholders, they are acting in one of those market
contexts that activate all of their bottom-line desires and not their other
values.  Just as looking at a glass of cold water may focus one’s
attention on his thirst, staring at a prospectus may make one focus on a
corporation’s profitability.  A shareholder’s interactions with a
corporation, in others words, is structured in such a way that naturally
leads to a focus on profit maximization.  It does not, however, tell us
that shareholders or others do not have nonpecuniary interests in the
corporation— those interests are just not being adequately reflected in
the corporate voting scheme.
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTION OF SHAREHOLDER
PREFERENCE AGGREGATION
In the modern corporation, voting rights are limited to
shareholders and are often parsed out on a one share, one vote
basis.  Both of these limitations on the corporate franchise are
premised on the belief that shareholders have a homogeneous
interest in the corporation.  As discussed in the previous section,
however, shareholder interests diverge widely along many
225 See id.
226 See id.
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different axes.  The premise of the argument, in other words, is
false.
But even if the premise of shareholder homogeneity were
true— even if shareholders had some unique, coherently similar
interest in the corporate residual— many of the arguments made
from that premise are flawed. In other words, the justifications for
existing corporate voting structures are often flawed in both their
inception and execution.  This section examines one of the
principal lines of reasoning from shareholder homogeneity to
voting restrictions to make this point.
A.  The Argument from Arrow’s Theorem
 One argument, especially popular among those with a law
and economics bent, relies on the centerpiece of social choice
theory: Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.  Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel provide a typical account:
There is another reason why only one class of
participants in the venture commonly holds dispositive
voting rights at one time. The voters, and the directors
they elect, must determine both the objectives of the
firm and the general methods of achieving them. It is
well known, however, that when voters hold dissimilar
preferences it is not possible to aggregate their
preferences into a consistent system of choices.  If a
firm makes inconsistent choices, it is likely to self-
destruct. Consistency is possible, however, when
voters commonly hold the same ranking of choices (or
when the rankings are at least single-peaked).227
This argument, however, fundamentally misconstrues the Arrow’s
Theorem and attendant social choice literature.
227 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note XX, at XX, citing KENNETH J.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE & INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963) and DUNCAN BLACK,
THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958).
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Arrow’s Theorem holds that no social choice procedure can
simultaneously satisfy four relatively undemanding conditions of
democratic fairness and guarantee a transitive outcome.228  The
first condition, nondictatorship, demands that no single person’s
preference order determines the social preference order regardless
of what others prefer.229  The second condition, Pareto efficiency,
requires that if everyone prefers one alternative over another, then
the social choice procedure must reproduce that ordering.230  The
third condition, universal admissibility, demands that the social
choice procedure works with any possible set of individual
preference orders.231  The final fairness condition, independence
from irrelevant alternatives, requires that the introduction of a new
“irrelevant” alternative into the preference profile does not affect
the relative orderings of the other alternatives.232  The logical
condition of transitivity guarantees that the social choice function
will produce a complete and transitive social preference order: if A
is preferred to B, and B to C, then A must be preferred to C.233
228 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22-31,
51-58 (2d ed. 1963); see also NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER,
MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 19-23 (1978) (summarizing the assumptions,
conditions, and conclusions of the theorem); PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME
THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 62-65 (1986) (providing a
concise outline of a proof of the theorem); Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some
Implications of Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 297-
99 (summarizing the conditions of fairness and logicality) (hereinafter “Hayden
I”); Grant M. Hayden, The Limits of Social Choice Theory: A Defense of the
Voting Rights Act, 74 TULANE L. REV. 87, 99-102 (1999) (same) (hereinafter
“Hayden II”).
229 See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE
295 (1982); Hayden I, supra note XX, at 297; Hayden II, supra note XX, at 101.
230 See RIKER, supra note XX, at 117-18; Hayden I, supra note XX, at 297;
Hayden II, supra note XX, at 101.
231 See RIKER, supra note XX, at 116, 297; Hayden I, supra note XX< at 298;
Hayden II, supra note XX, at 101.
232 See RIKER, supra note XX, at 118; Hayden I, supra note XX, at 298-99;
Hayden II, supra note XX. At 101.  The term “irrelevant” is not intended to be
pejorative, but instead refers to an alternative outside the set from which a group
must choose that does not alter the desirability of the other alternatives relative
to each other. See Hayden II, supra note XX, at 101.
233 See RIKER, supra note XX, at 119, 297; Hayden I, supra note XX, at 299;
Hayden II, supra note XX, at 101-02.
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The contrary— an intransitive preference order where A is
preferred to B, B to C, and C to A— is referred to as a voting cycle,
and indicates an inability of the social choice procedure to declare
a winner, at least one that is meaningful.234
With respect to shareholder voting rights, then, the argument
from Arrow’s theorem is as follows.  The theorem tells us that we
cannot devise a corporate voting procedure that meets all of
Arrow’s fairness conditions and, at the same time, guarantees a
consistent (i.e., acyclical) outcome.  Something— either one of the
fairness conditions or a guaranteed transitive outcome— has to
give.  The fairness condition of universal admissibility requires
that people be allowed to vote regardless of their particular
preferences.  But adhering to that condition by allowing groups of
people with dissimilar preferences to vote in corporate elections
will result in inconsistent corporate decision-making, which, in
turn, would cause a corporation to “self destruct.”  Thus, to avoid
such an outcome, we should restrict voting rights to groups with
similar interests.  (This straightforwardly violates the condition of
universal admissibility, but, again, something has to give.)
Shareholders, given their homogeneous interest in the corporate
residual, fit the bill.  Thus, restricting voting rights to shareholders
avoids corporate disaster.
This argument from Arrow’s Theorem is deeply flawed.  It is
based on a limited understanding of the theorem and it
overestimates both the likelihood and impact of voting cycles in
corporate elections.  In the end, the argument amounts to little
more than opportunistic hand-waving.
B.  Shortcomings of the Argument from Arrow’s Theorem
There are several reasons why Arrow’s Theorem doesn’t
provide much of a foundation for shareholder primacy.  First,
shareholder agreement on the goal of wealth maximization, even if
true, does not indicate agreement on how best to achieve that goal.
More specifically, it does not mean that shareholders have the
same preference rankings with respect to candidates for
234 See Hayden I, supra note XX, at 299; Hayden II, supra note XX, at 101-02.
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directorships.  (If it did, there would be no reason to have elections
in the first place, since we could just ask one of the shareholders to
tell us these shared preference rankings of the group.)
Shareholders may, and often do, wildly disagree over the proper
course of action for their corporation.  And even if they were to
agree on the direction for their corporation, they may well have
very different ideas about which candidates would best effectuate
it.235  Because Arrow’s Theorem operates on the level of individual
preference orders over an array of alternatives (here, candidates),
underlying agreement on the general goal of the corporation does
little to ensure that a particular voting system will be free from
Arrovian intransitivities.
 Second, even if shareholder homogeneity with respect to
profit maximization reduced the incidence of cycles in corporate
director elections, that isn’t a powerful argument in favor of
allowing only shareholders to vote.  The theorem shows no social
choice procedure can simultaneously fulfill the four conditions of
democratic fairness and one condition of logicality, but the
theorem says nothing about which condition should be sacrificed
when designing a voting structure.  That decision depends on an
assessment of the costs associated with sacrificing one of the
conditions of democratic fairness and, on the flip side, the practical
likelihood and costs associated with intransitive outcomes.  And
those who use Arrow’s theorem to argue in favor of restricting
voting rights to shareholders have not made the case for their
choice of conditions to sacrifice.
Because Arrow’s theorem applies to all social choice
functions, including all corporate voting systems, we know that a
voting system where shareholders alone may cast votes must
violate one of the conditions of democratic fairness or
transitivity.236  And it does: restricting voting rights to shareholders
because of their purported agreement with each other is a
straightforward violation of the condition of universal
235 Also missing is an argument of why underlying agreement on profit
maximization make it more likely that shareholder preferences are single-peaked
with respect to director candidates.  More on this below.
236 See Hayden I, supra note XX, at 299-304 (providing examples of how the
Condorcet method, the amendment procedure, the Borda count, and cumulative
voting systems all fall prey to Arrow’s Theorem).
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admissibility.  That condition, remember, demands that a voting
procedure work with every permutation of voter preferences over a
set of alternatives.  And like the other fundamental requirements of
democratic fairness, universal admissibility is relatively
uncontroversial. Giving up this condition— by restricting
individual preference orders— runs counter to a fundamental
democratic principle: people should not be declared ineligible to
vote because of their opinions.
And, just to be clear, this is not one of those situations where
people with an interest in an election, to whom we would
otherwise extend the right to vote, just naturally happen to have
preferences that, collectively, do not produce intransitivities.237  In
those situations, the condition of universal admissibility is not
sacrificed by denying anyone the right to vote from the outset.
Because the voters encounter no prior restraint on their preference
orders, the principal justification for universal admissibility— the
immorality of denying the ballot to people with certain preference
orders— is not implicated.  Sacrificing universal admissibility in
such situations sacrifices very little.  Here, however, the argument
made here is that people other than shareholders, even if they have
an interest in an election, should be denied the right to vote from
the outset because they have preferences orders that, when
combined with those of the shareholders, may produce a voting
cycle.  The argument, then, implicates the full weight of the
justification behind the condition of universal admissibility.
Given the obvious democratic cost of disenfranchising
interested voters because of their opinions, the argument that
Arrow’s Theorem inevitably leads us to restrict voting rights to
shareholders is not at all compelling.  If you’re willing to sacrifice
universal admissibility, why not further restrict voting rights to
237 See, e.g., Hayden I, supra note XX, at 312 (arguing that the racial bloc voting
requirements of certain claims under the Voting Rights Act may represent a case
of “naturally occurring” spectrum agreement that decreases the incidence of
cycling); Hayden II, supra note XX, at 109-32 (arguing that the level of
spectrum agreement required in Voting Rights Act claims, while not complete,
is sufficient to reduce the incidence of cycling to near zero).  As will be
discussed below, many groups of people associated through a polity or a
corporation may have sufficiently common reference points to greatly reduce the
incidence of intransitivities.
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those who agree on the precise direction that the corporation
should go, or, better yet, on the slate of directors to take it there?
(After all, that kind of agreement, unlike a shared goal of profit
maximization, may actually guarantee a transitive outcome.)  Or
why not sacrifice one of the other conditions of democratic
fairness?  Restricting the vote to shareholders is certainly not the
only choice procedure that may eliminate the possibility of cyclical
results— one could also have a system where the shareholder
named Matt Bodie chooses the directors (which, despite the
obvious upside, violates nondictatorship) or a system where the
directors are randomly chosen (which violates Pareto efficiency).
The point here is that the case for sacrificing universal
admissibility in this instance has not been made, and we’re really
just left with the question we started with: should voting rights be
restricted to shareholders?
C.  The Likelihood and Impact of Corporate Voting Cycles
The argument is all the more surprising given that it does not
really analyze the likelihood or cost of intransitive results.  As it
turns out, the likelihood of cyclical outcomes, even when voting is
not limited to shareholders, is probably quite small, and the cost of
such outcomes, when they do occur, is probably negligible (and
certainly not likely to cause a corporation to “self destruct”).  This
is true for several reasons.
Initially, we should note that empirical observations across a
broad range of voting mechanisms have failed to discover the large
number of intransitivities initially predicted by social choice
theory.238  This is probably because those early predictions were
based on the assumption that all individual preference orders were
equally likely to occur in a preference profile— that individual
238 See Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, Partial Single-Peakedness: An
Extension and Clarification, 51 PUB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1986) (explaining that
“empirical observations of a wide variety of actual collective decisionmaking
processes indicate that cyclical majorities are very rare”); Bernard Grofman,
Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a
“Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1553 (1993).
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preference orders were somehow randomly distributed.239  With
randomly distributed preference profiles, for example, in a large
election with as few as six alternatives, almost one-third of the
possible preference profiles produce intransitive outcomes.240
Without that assumption, however, the predicted frequency of
cycles varies tremendously, and there are several aspects of real-
world preference profiles that greatly increase the likelihood of
transitive outcomes.
One condition of a preference profile that ensures transitive
outcomes is something loosely referred to as spectrum
agreement.241  Spectrum agreement occurs when all voters have a
common spectrum upon which they array their preferences.  This
should not be confused with agreement on the order of those
alternatives.  Take, for example, a case where all the individuals
rank candidates based on whether the candidates for corporation
director promise to maximize profits (one end of the spectrum) or
to minimize profits (the other end of the spectrum).  There are
three candidates running for office— a profit maximizer (p), a
wastrel (w), and some evenhanded chap in between (m).  Voters
who want to maximize profits will most prefer candidate P and
least prefer candidate W, with M somewhere in between.
Conversely, voters who want to throw money away will most
prefer W, followed by M, with P last.  Moderate voters will have
preference orders of M-P-W or M-W-P, depending on whether
they are closer to the profit or wastrel side of the spectrum.
Although these voters rank the candidates in different orders, their
preferences can all be aligned along the same profit maximizing-
profit minimizing spectrum.  No voter, for example, would rank
239 See Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg, A Mathematical Solution for
the Probability of the Paradox of Voting, 13 BEHAV. SCI. 317, 321 (1968).
240 See id. at 322 & tbl.2.
241 See Hayden I, supra note XX, at 306-07; Hayden II, supra note XX, at 107-
108.  Although the term spectrum agreement seems to imply some express
understanding between voters, it is enough that voter preferences may be
arrayed on a common continuum, regardless of whether the voters agreed ahead
of time or, indeed, even know about it.  For a more specific definition of the
necessary conditions for transitivity, see notes XX-XX, infra, and accompanying
text.
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the moderate candidate last, as agreement on the spectrum
precludes such an ordering.
This type of spectrum agreement is important because it is a
sufficient condition of transitivity.  When all voters align the
alternatives on a common spectrum, a simple majoritarian voting
procedure will produce a transitive social ordering.242  This is true
despite the fact that the voters vehemently disagree on relative
merits of the candidates; indeed, the earlier example included
voters who wanted profits maximized and those who wanted
profits minimized.  But so long as there is agreement on the
spectrum, an acyclic result is guaranteed.
Spectrum agreement of this sort may be described in a
variety of technical ways, all of which constitute a sufficient
condition for transitive outcomes.  For example, a group of
individual preference profiles may be “single-peaked” if there is a
single horizontal ordering (a spectrum) where every one of the
individual orders may be arranged such that each has a most
desired alternative and prefers other alternative less as they are
further from his ideal point.243  The outcome of simple a simple
majority vote is guaranteed to be transitive, and the winner will be
the ideal point of the median voter.244  The same sort of outcome is
true of profiles that are, analogously, single-caved or polarized.245
A second, related condition of transitivity occurs when a
preference profile is “value restricted.”246  A triple of alternatives
is value restricted if at least one alternative is never first, middle, or
last in every individual’s preference order.247  The example
mentioned earlier— with the profit maximizer, wastrel, and
moderate— involved a preference profile that was both single-
242See RIKER, supra note XX, at 123-28.
243 See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 19-25
(1958); DUNCAN BLACK & R.A. NEWING, COMMITTEE DECISIONS WITH
COMPLEMENTARY VALUATION 19-28 (1951); Duncan Black, On the Rationale
of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948).
244 See BLACK, supra note XX, at 126-29.
245 See id.
246 See Amartya K. Sen, A Possibiity Theorem on Majority Decisions, 34
ECONOMETRICA 491, 492-93 (1966).
247 See id.
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peaked (on the array of profit maximizing or minimizing) and
value restricted (candidate m was never ranked last).
One potential drawback to these various indicia of spectrum
agreement is that they must be complete in order to guarantee
transitive outcomes.248  If, for example, even one voter in an
otherwise value-restricted preference profile ranks an alternative
where she shouldn’t (the rank order that made the profile value-
restricted to begin with), the guarantee of a transitive outcome
disappears.249  For this reason, one early commentator explained
that “the various equilibrium conditions for majority rule are
incompatible with even a very modest degree of heterogeneity of
tastes, and for most purposes are probably not significantly less
restrictive than the extreme condition of complete unanimity of
individual preferences.”250  Perhaps, then, we should still be wary
of the possibility of cyclical outcomes in our voting procedures.
Fortunately, later work in social choice theory has shown that
the likelihood of transitive outcomes does not wholly depend upon
the assurance of complete spectrum agreement.  Instead, much
lesser degrees of voter homogeneity may be sufficient.  Richard
Niemi, for example, proved that a larger proportion of single-
peaked or otherwise value restricted preference orders increased
the probability of an acyclic result.251  This is especially true,
counterintuitively, as the number of voters increases.252  His result
was confirmed by later studies using other measures of social
248 See Feld & Grofman, supra note XX, at 72-73 (“[I]f even one individual has
non-single-peaked preferences then there can be a paradox of cyclical
majorities”); Richard G. Niemi, Majority Decision-Making with Partial
Unidimensionality, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 488, 488 (1969) (“[T]he preference
ordering of every individual must be single peaked’ for “majority voting [to]
yield a transitive social ordering”).
249 See Hayden II, supra note XX, at 125-26 (providing an example of a
preference profile where sixteen of seventeen preference orders are single-
peaked yet a majority vote produces an intransitive outcome).
250 Gerald H. Kramer, On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule,
41 ECONOMOMETRICA 285, 285 (1973).
251 See Niemi, supra note XX, at 488.
252 See Niemi, supra note XX, at 493-94; Hayden II, supra note XX, at 127-28.
This is counterintuitive because the likelihood of transitive outcomes decreases
as you increase the number of individuals in a randomly chosen profile. See
Niemi, supra note XX, at 493-94.
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homogeneity.253  And it was supported by other work that looked
at preference profiles as a whole, which concluded that society
often acts in a way that is more ideological than the individuals
that compose it.254  Overall, then, it turns out that “[t]he [voting]
paradox can be very satisfactorily avoided if common frames of
reference are widespread but far less than unanimous.”255
There is a wide range of political and sociological reasons
why members of societies will exhibit a large degree of spectrum
agreement.  Most democracies, for example, require a degree of
consensus at their formation, and common socialization may shape
individual frames of reference.256  (This may explain why there are
so few observed cycles in the political arena.)  Those reasons
would apply with particular force in corporate elections, which,
after all, involves an organization designed to facilitate certain
kinds of economic activity.  The various categories of people
interested in the organization may disagree about many aspects of
its governance, but very likely share the common frames of
reference that lead to transitive election results.  There is good
reason to believe, in other words, that the number of intransitivities
in corporate director elections is likely to be quite low.
Further, the case has not been made that the occasional
intransitivity would really do much harm, and certainly not that it
would result in a “firm [that] makes inconsistent choices” leading
it to “self destruct.”257  Initially, a large proportion of intransitive
results are middle or bottom cycles that still allow us to pick clear
winners despite producing cycles involving lower ranked
candidates.  But, more important, there is a difference between an
Arrovian-type of inconsistency in the election of a board member
and a firm that makes inconsistent choices.  First, most voting
253 See, e.g., Dean Jamison & Edward Luce, Social Homogeneity and the
Probability of Intransitive Majority Rule, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 79, 84-86 (1972);
Peter C. Fishburn, Voter Concordance, Simple Majorities, and Group Decision
Methods, 18 BEHAV. SCI. 364, 371-72 ((1973); Hayden II, supra note XX, at
128-30.
254 See Feld & Grofman, supra note XX, at 73-79; Hayden II, supra note XX, at
130-31.
255 Niemi, supra note XX, at 494.
256 See FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER, supra note XX, at 19-20.
257 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note XX, at XX.
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systems are structured in a way that produces a winner, regardless
of whether an intransitivity may mean that a slightly altered voting
sequence or procedure may have produced a different winner.  So
the firm wouldn’t suffer for lack of directors.  Second, even if the
candidate that was the product of an intransitive result somehow
held views that did not adequately reflect the views of the voters,
she is only one of, say, eleven directors.  There is no argument
made that the presence of such a director would somehow produce
further intransitivities when the board itself makes various
decisions.  And even in that situation it is unclear what inconsistent
board decisions would mean, exactly, or how they would translate
into the destruction of the firm.  In other words, one has to tell a
fantastic story in order to move from an occasional intransitivity in
a board election to a firm that makes self-destructive choices, one
that is so fantastic as to be completely implausible.
At this point, then, it is clear that shareholders do not have
homogeneous interest in profit maximization.  And even if
shareholders did have a homogenous interest in profit
maximization, it does not directly translate into the kind of
agreement on candidates necessary to avoid intransitive results in
corporate elections.  Further, even if shareholder homogeneity did
translate into the requisite agreement on candidates, restricting
voting rights to shareholders involves sacrificing a fundamental
condition of democracy in a situation where the likelihood of
intransitive results is already negligible.  The argument for
restricting corporate voting rights to shareholders, then, is far from
compelling.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF HETEROGENEITY
 The notion of shareholder homogeneity is critical to the
normative premise behind “one share, one vote.”  Easterbrook and
Fischel emphasized that shareholders are likely to have “similar if
not identical” interests because “the shareholders of a given firm at
a given time are a reasonably homogenous group.”258  This
homogeneity has several beneficial effects.  First, it gives all
258 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF1, at 70.
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shareholders an equal incentive to monitor agency costs so as to
reduce such costs for all shareholders.259  If shareholders have
different interests, they will have different incentives to reduce
agency costs incurred by the corporate form.  Second, shareholders
with the same interests will have the same objectives for the firm.
This consistency of purpose will prevent the firm from becoming a
war zone of competing preferences.  Easterbrook and Fischel,
along with others, have argued that this consistency amongst voter
preferences is the key to the stability and prosperity of the
corporate form.260
 Moreover, shareholder homogeneity would solve the
interpersonal utility problem discussed in Part I.  In a democratic
state, voting systems based on “one person, one vote” assume that
each person has an equal interest and set of preferences to be
expressed in the election.  This assumption is almost certainly
incorrect.261  With shares, however, we can define each person’s
interests and preferences in a corporate election as the number of
shares that they hold.  Like landowners in a “one acre, one vote”
water district, shareholders have an interest in the company that is
clearly defined: it is the percentage of residual they are entitled to
based on the number of shares they hold.  If we define a
shareholder’s utility as the interest in the residual, a shareholder’s
voting power is perfectly correlated with her interest in the
residual.
 We know, however, that shareholders are not, in fact,
homogenous.  As discussed above,262 all of the following types of
shareholders have interests beyond the residual: majority
shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate voting rights,
259 Martin & Partnoy, supra note MP1, at 776 (noting that the notion of “one
share, one vote” is based on “agency costs considerations”); Robert H. Sitkoff,
Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (2002) (noting that any rule
other than one share, one vote “wastefully increases the agency costs associated
with the corporate form”).
260 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF1, at 69-70. See also  HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 62 (1996) (“Investors-owned firms
have the important advantage that their owners generally share a single well-
defined objective: to maximize the net present value of the firm’s earnings.”).
261 Hayden, supra note XX, at 236-47.
262 See supra Part III.
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members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged
shareholders, and employee and management shareholders.  In
each case, the shareholder has interests than threaten to override
the shareholder’s individual interest in the residual.
 Moreover, shareholder heterogeneity is not simply a matter
of shareholders with discrete competing interests.  There is also
heterogeneity amongst shareholders with respect to their definition
of wealth maximization.  As discussed above,263 the definition of
wealth maximization can be quite different for different
shareholders.  There is the time horizon issue: at what point is
wealth to be maximized?  A hedge fund looking for a quick return
is different than an index fund looking to stay in the stock as long
as it is listed.  There is also the question of the diversified
portfolio: to what extent is the shareholder seeking to maximize
this individual stock or across the portfolio?  This divide has led
some commentators to suggest a normative system of portfolio
wealth maximization, rather than share wealth maximization.264
Relatedly, shareholders have different risk preferences and may
have different tastes for the corporation’s approach to risk based on
the ratio of their holdings in the individual firm compared to their
overall holdings.265  Shareholders might agree on the goal of
wealth maximization and might also share risk and time horizon
preferences, but they still might very well disagree about choices
the corporation makes in these areas.266
263 See Part III supra.
264 Hansen & Lott, supra note HL1. See also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional
Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisted, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1022, 1056 (1996) (discussing the differences between the
“corporate law” fictional shareholder and the “portfolio investor” shareholder).
265 For example, an investor that owns $50,000 in stock in company A and has
$100,000 overall in his portfolio will have different risk preferences for the firm
than will a shareholder who has $50,000 in stock in company A and has $10
million overall in her portfolio.  The declining marginal utility of wealth also
means that the performance of company A has less effect on the utility of the
second shareholder utility, even though both shareholders have the same number
of shares.
266 For example, Hewlett-Packard shareholders recently battled over the wisdom
of the merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq.  Michael Brick & Steve
Lohr, Fiorina Claims Victory in Hewlett-Compaq Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
March 19, 2002.  Hewlett-Packard director Walter Hewlett battled the rest of the
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Furthermore, the notion that shareholders have a shared
interest in wealth maximization is a simplifying assumption.
Shareholders are heterogeneous with respect to their utility
preferences in that these preferences do not match up directly with
wealth.  Shareholders – when assessed as individual people – all
have individual utility preferences that go beyond maximization of
one’s wealth.  In their role as shareholder, individuals may put
these interests aside and focus solely on wealth maximization.  But
as the growth of socially responsible investing demonstrates,
shareholders may find room to seek non-wealth utility in the
corporate setting.
If it seems far-fetched that most shareholders have such
heterogeneity, it is only because shareholders in publicly-held
companies have no avenues for displaying such heterogeneity.
The panoply of shareholder concerns and interests are on constant
display in closely-held corporations: there are conflicts over
dividend schedules, management staffing, executive salaries,
corporate culture, and product development.  When shareholders
have real power to change corporate policy, they exercise this
power in a variety of ways.  However, non-controlling
shareholders in public corporations cannot generally effectuate
changes in corporate policy through their power to vote.267  The
miniscule voting power held by most properly diversified
shareholders is only part of the problem. In board of directors
elections, shareholders only have a choice if an opposition slate is
running against the incumbent board.  Such a campaign would
require the opposition to invest in expensive proxy materials and
disclosure.268  If there is no opposition, then the shareholder’s vote
has no effect on the corporate leadership structure.
company’s board and management over the merger, ultimately losing in a close
election.  Both sides agreed that the merger should be judged on its impact of
Hewlett-Packard’s success, but they disagreed about whether the merger would
help accomplish that goal.  Hewlett and the company spent an estimated  $100
million in their efforts to persuade shareholders. Brick & Lohr, supra note BF1.
267 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
676, 682-94 (2007) (describing the lack of effective shareholder voting power).
268 Id. at 688-91 (discussing how proxy costs may run to “hundreds of thousands of
dollars”).
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Thus, the notion of a monolithic shareholder primacy norm is
effectuated not by shareholder democracy, but instead by
shareholder apathy.  Shareholders in a public company have long
been divorced from real control of the firm.269  Thus, most
shareholders in public companies are rationally uninterested in
exercising their voting in an informed manner.  The time and costs
associated with researching how best to exercise their preferences
would greatly outweigh the utility they would gain from voting in
a largely meaningless election.  As such, most shareholders will
not become properly informed and thus will not use the vote to
further their disparate interests.  Instead, share voters generally
tend to follow the directions of the board and management, when
they bother to vote at all.270
Shareholders’ inability to exercise their control rights results
in a power vacuum at the center of the firm. The incumbent board
and management are well-placed to occupy that vacuum.  The
shareholder primacy norm acts as a counterweight on behalf of the
shareholders – a norm that the board and management are expected
to follow for the benefit of the shareholders.  But it is important to
remember than the norm of shareholder wealth maximization is a
fictional placeholder developed to replace the actual interests of
the shareholders.271  If shareholders truly expressed their
preferences through their votes, there would be no need for the
norm of residual maximization.  Instead, the board and
management would be expected to follow the actual preferences of
shareholders, rather than simply a presumed wealth maximization
preference.
Thus, we see the strange cycle that Easterbrook and Fischel,
amongst others, have used to justify shareholders as the sole
franchisees.  Shareholders, we are told, will single-mindedly focus
on increasing the residual as their sole preference for corporate
269 BERLE & MEANS,, supra note BM1.
270 See, e.g., Yair J. Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, at 13-
14, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper, available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980695 (noting that “management sponsored proposals
typically pass easily,” with a mean approval rate of 85 percent).
271 Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note DG1, at 1052 (“For fictional
shareholders, whatever else the people behind them may want, all want to
maximize the value of their shares.”).
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policy.  Because it is in the interests of all corporate stakeholders
that the residual be maximized, we should give power to those who
have a single-minded focus on such an outcome.272  However, this
single-minded focus is simply an assumption.  And in reality, the
varying interests of shareholders do not comport with the notion of
a shareholder electorate with one homogenized goal.  Thus, neither
the means nor the ends hold up: shareholders will not all have the
same preferences, and thus they will not all seek to effectuate those
standards in lock-step voting patterns.
 It is for this reason that the shareholder primacy norm has
been described as a tool for constraining horizontal conflict
amongst shareholders, rather than a tool for maintaining
shareholder power over other corporate stakeholders.  As Gordon
Smith has described, the shareholder primacy norm developed as a
response to minority oppression.273  The oppression doctrine
prevents the controlling shareholder from pursuing her own
individual interests; she instead must seek to maximize the value of
the shares of the corporation as a whole.  In this way, the
controlling shareholder is constrained against following her own
(heterogeneous) interests and must look to benefit all shareholders
equally.274  The “shareholder primacy” norm, accompanied by
equitable anti-oppression doctrine, is necessary because the power
of the franchise will not mitigate this problem; in fact, it is the
cause of the problem.  The shareholder primacy norm is, in effect,
a way of forcing homogeneity onto a very diverse set of
shareholder interests.
 Viewed this way, the shareholder franchise is not justified on
the grounds of their own preference for wealth maximization.
Instead, the shareholder franchise is simply one tool in the
corporate law arsenal for enforcing the norm of shareholder wealth
maximization.275  Presumably, there are some issues on which
272 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF2, at 403.
273 Smith, supra note GS1.
274 Id.
275 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (“Like many
intracorporate contracts, however, the shareholder wealth maximization norm
does not easily lend itself to judicial enforcement except in especially
provocative situations.  Instead, it is enforced indirectly through a complex and
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most or even all shareholders would agree, and thus the vote
allows shareholders to exercise collective power over the
composition of the board or the completion of a certain transaction.
However, the shareholder primacy norm is about more than just
the vote.  The norm is indifferent or even hostile to the preferences
of actual shareholders.  Instead, the norm assumes that
shareholders all prefer wealth maximization and then requires the
corporation to be run accordingly.276
Because shareholder preferences are irrelevant to shareholder
primacy, true shareholder democracy is actually a threat to the
shareholder wealth maximization norm.  If let loose to express
their actual preferences, shareholders might express their
preferences for a variety of interests beyond shareholder wealth
maximization.277  Perhaps this explains the recent move of scholars
such as Stephen Bainbridge, who supports the goal of shareholder
wealth maximization but argues against greater shareholder
input.278  Bainbridge bases his argument primarily on the need for
centralized and largely unreviewable discretion in order to
maximize efficient business operations.279  According to
varied set of extrajudicial accountability mechanisms, of which shareholder
voting is one.”)
276 Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note DG1, at 1052 (“It follows,
then, that the separation of ownership and control is not a vaguely illegitimate
deprivation of the rightful prerogatives of ownership, but rather a supremely
sensible application of the division of labor.”); id. at 1053 (“We have come then
to a solution to the shareholder puzzle.  The fictional shareholder reduces
politics to administration.”).
277 Id. at 1052-53 (“If the corporation were run by and for real people, it would
be a hotbed of political controversy. . . . If the real people disagree with the
fictional representation, the real people may simply be disregarded as not real
shareholders.”).
278 See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
supra note SB1; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: the Means and Ends
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2002).
279 Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note
SB1, at 1749 (“Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the widely held public
corporation practicable: namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable
decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. The chief economic virtue of
the public corporation is . . . that it provides a hierarchical decisionmaking
structure well-suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise with
January 2008] ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE                       81
Bainbridge, shareholders should only have limited voting rights:
“shareholder voting is properly understood not as a primary
component of the corporate decisionmaking structure, but rather as
an accountability device of last resort, to be used sparingly, at
most.”280  Instead, the corporation requires “the centralization of
essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board of
directors.”281  As long as the directors operate within the
shareholder wealth maximization norms, their decisions in leading
the company will be left alone.
Shareholders have a diverse set of competing interests.  The
right to vote provides a mechanism for shareholders to express
those interests vis-à-vis the actual control of the company.  In
reality, however, only shareholders in closely-held companies have
the power and incentives to vote their preferences.  In the absence
of actual expressions of preferences, the shareholder wealth
maximization norm serves as a theoretical stand-in for shareholder
preferences.  But this norm is just that – a stand-in.  If corporate
law theory justifies the shareholder franchise based on a
homogenous, uniform interest in increasing the residual, it is based
on a fiction.  In reality, shareholders have a heterogeneous set of
interests that are muted only because of the weakness of the
shareholder franchise.  A stronger form of shareholder democracy
would, in all likelihood, exacerbate these divisions by providing
more expression for actual preferences.  A true shareholder
democracy, then, would not reflect the vision of a single-minded
electorate pursuing the goal of residual maximization to the benefit
of it. It would instead reflect what it really is: control of the
corporation by one group of stakeholders.
numerous employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other
constituencies.”).
280 Id. at 1750.  According to Bainbridge, this limited right is negotiated through
contract. Id. (“[S]hareholders have certain contractual rights, which include the
requirement that directors maximize shareholder wealth as their principal
decisionmaking norm.”).  However, to the extent that corporations are creatures
of state law, Bainbridge’s contractual analysis fails to justify shareholders as the
sole participants in the corporate franchise as set by state law.
281 Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note SBLSVR, at 626.
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CONCLUSION
 Democracies, both political and corporate, have developed
voting systems designed to translate individual preferences into
institutional choices.  Political democracies typically tie the right to
vote to the level of a person’s interest in the outcome of the election.
People with any type of strong interest in a governmental institution
are typically granted the right to vote so long as there is some
manageable way to identify them.  Corporate democracies, on the
other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite
narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone.  This
restriction has found its justification the assumption that shareholders
have a homogeneous interest in corporate wealth maximization.  Such
homogeneity, it is argued, maximizes efficient preference satisfaction.
Unfortunately, the assumption of shareholder homogeneity and
many of the conclusions drawn from it are false.  It is becoming
increasing clear, for example, that shareholders have many different
types of interests in a corporation.  In addition, stakeholders such as
employees, consumers, and creditors also have interests in corporate
governance that are not currently captured through existing contractual
regimes.  Moreover, many of the conclusions drawn from the
assumption of shareholder homogeneity are either based on dated
understandings of social choice theory or, in some cases, are flat out
inconsistent with the standard economic theory that they purport to
embody.  As a result, corporate voting schemes are sterile counterparts
of their more robust political counterparts.
Because of the theoretical weaknesses of the traditional
justifications for “one share, one vote” and the shareholder franchise,
corporate law scholars need to reconsider our foundational conceptions
of the corporation.  We must consider both proxy strength and
manageability in determining whether the right to vote would be a
proper expression of utility interests by a particular class of
stakeholders.  We should consider both categorical and temporal
dimensions of voting rights in making our determinations.282  To be
282 In looking at various interests, there will be a temptation to consider a static
model, in which various factions are constantly pitched in the midst of the same
battles.  However, interests change over time and depending on the situation.
Different corporate factions will have different arrays of alliances.  Perhaps even
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true to social utility, we must allow for the expression of monetary and
non-monetary utility in our preference aggregation.  Finally, we must
consider how interests and preferences can be expressed and protected
through the entire corporate structure.  As noted in Part I, whether one
votes or not is just the initial question.  The meaning of the vote is
defined by what is being voted on, what percentage of votes is
required to take action, the preferences and interest of other voters in
the election.  Although the corporate polity is generally constructed as
a majority vote of shareholders as to each position on the board, there
are a number of ways in which the polity could be reconstructed to
measure preferences.
These are only initial considerations, which we intend to pursue
in future works.  But we hope they will begin a reconsideration of the
theory behind the shareholder franchise commensurate with its current
rebirth in practice.
more importantly, the identities and preferences of the stakeholders themselves
will change over time.  Voting in the corporate context must be considered over
time, rather than through a one-round model. Cf. Adam B. Cox, The Temporal
Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361, 364 (2007) (rejecting the
position that “a narrow temporal frame is required for evaluating voting rights
claims”).
